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Following the adoption by the Basel
Committee of new capital rules for banks, a
process is now taking place in the EU to
transpose the rules into Community law and,
ultimately, into national legislation. This paper
gives an overview of the main issues that relate
to the EU implementation, mainly from the
perspectives of financial stability and financial
integration. Although the EU rules are to a
large extent based on the texts of the Basel
Committee, modifications have been
introduced to account for the specific legal and
institutional setting, as well as for some
features of the European financial system.
The paper gives an overview of these
modifications and deals in greater detail with a
number of selected topics: the monitoring of
procyclicality, the role of the consolidating
supervisor and the treatment of real estate
lending and covered bonds. The paper
concludes with an outlook for the future.
Key words: banks, Basel II, capital
requirements, financial regulation, financial
stability, financial supervision, risk management.
JEL classification: G21, G286
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In June 2004, the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision published its new capital rules for
banks (“Basel II”). Recently, the European
Parliament and the Council approved
legislation transposing these rules into
Community law and this legislation will,
in turn, be transposed into national law.
The European Central Bank (ECB) has an
interest in these developments because of their
possible implications for financial supervision,
financial stability and financial integration. As
well as providing a non-technical overview of
the main elements of the new framework, this
paper focuses on issues related to the European
Union (EU) implementation. The paper is
structured in two parts. Part I gives an overview
of Basel II and the main issues that are relevant
for its implementation in the EU. Against this
general setting, Part II deals in greater detail
with a number of selected topics that are
particularly important for the EU: the
monitoring of procyclicality, the role of the
consolidating supervisor and the treatment of
real estate lending and covered bonds.
Basel II is based on three mutually reinforcing
pillars: minimum capital requirements (Pillar
I), the supervisory review process (Pillar II)
and market discipline (Pillar III). A main
innovation is that a set of increasingly
sophisticated approaches is now available to
banks to calculate their minimum capital
requirements. Although the simplest method to
calculate capital for credit risk is based on
assessments by rating agencies, under the most
advanced approaches, banks are allowed to use
their own estimated risk parameters. Moreover,
for the first time, banks are required to hold
capital for operational risk.
While the EU rules are to a very large extent
similar to those developed by the Basel
Committee, they are not an exact copy. First,
the legal and institutional setting is different.
The EU rules are legislative in nature and
binding in all Member States. Moreover, the
recently established Committee of European
Banking Supervisors (CEBS) will play a major
role in developing supervisory guidance to
implement the new rules. Second, the specific
structure of the European financial system,
such as the role of the Single Market, justifies
certain deviations.
The EU rules diverge from Basel II in their
scope of application and the range of
approaches that will be available to institutions
to calculate their capital requirements. They
also change the supervisory responsibilities
by giving a larger role to the consolidating
supervisor and by requiring supervisory
disclosure. In the Single Market there is
a greater need for cooperation between
supervisors. Some specific features of the EU
economy and financial system need to be
addressed as well. This includes venture
capital, real estate lending and covered bonds.
In addition, the EU rules provide for specific
arrangements concerning the issue of
procyclicality. Empirical evidence indicates
that capital rules can indeed exacerbate the
economic cycle. However, in the development
of the new rules various changes were made
to accommodate these concerns. A study
performed under the auspices of the European
Commission confirmed that procyclicality
should no longer be a major problem, although
it should be kept under review. To that end, the
EU rules provide for a monitoring arrangement
that also involves the ECB.
In more detail, the EU rules provide for an
enhanced role of the consolidating supervisor,
in particular, through the process of approval of
advanced methods to calculate capital
requirements on a group-wide basis. Although
this extended role does not go as far as some
large financial groups would like, it will
simplify the interaction between the banking
group and its supervisors as well as between the
various supervisors. It is also likely to be
beneficial for financial stability and
integration, although it raises complex
implementation issues that will need to be
followed up closely.7
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Real estate lending is another important area
given its significance in bank lending and that
banking crises have often coincided with crises
in the real estate market. In the treatment of real
estate lending, the EU rules seem to achieve
greater consistency than Basel II, although this
leads to a somewhat less conservative
treatment of commercial real estate lending.
From a financial stability perspective,
however, it is important that this more lenient
treatment does not apply to the more risky real
estate, the income of which is used for debt
servicing. Some of the rules offer further scope
for supervisory convergence, which would be
beneficial for the integration of real estate
lending in Europe.
Covered bonds receive a specific treatment
under the EU rules that is not present in Basel
II. These financing instruments, with the
“Pfandbrief” as its best-known exponent, are
important for EU capital markets. This
preferential treatment, reflecting the additional
security inherent in these bonds, is fully
consistent with the principles underlying Basel
II. It also seems that most of the existing
covered bonds in the EU would qualify for this
preferential treatment.
This paper concludes by listing some key
challenges for the capital rules, first, as regards
their EU implementation and, second, in a
long run perspective. In the longer term, the
definition of regulatory capital and its
interaction with the new accounting rules will
have to be addressed. Other areas which may
warrant further study relate to the blurring of
the border between credit risk and market risk,
and the possible use of full credit portfolio
models by banks to calculate their capital
requirements.
INTRODUCTION
In June 2004, the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS) published its new
solvency rules for banks1, the New Capital
Framework (“Basel II”).2 A parallel process
has taken place in the EU to transpose the
internationally agreed capital standards into
Community law. Member States will also have
to transpose the EU rules into national
legislation in due course.
The ECB has an interest in these new rules
because of its responsibilities in the areas of
financial supervision and financial stability.3
The New Framework may also affect the
Eurosystem credit operations through its rules
for ratings assigned to financial assets used as
collateral for such operations.4 In addition, the
proposed EU rules provide for arrangements to
monitor the macro-economic impact of the
New Framework, which includes a specific role
for the ECB. Finally, the implementation of the
new solvency rules may have implications for
financial integration, a Community objective
that is supported by the ECB. The ECB was
actively involved in the discussions on the new
rules through its participation in the BCBS and
European fora, and via its policy advice.5
This paper aims to give an overview of the main
issues related to the implementation of the New
Framework in the EU, especially from the
perspectives of financial stability and financial
integration. Although the proposed EU rules
are to a large extent similar to the ones
developed by the Basel Committee, they are not
an exact copy of them. First, the legal and
institutional setting is different. The EU
framework is legislative in nature and therefore
binding in all Member States. Moreover,
account has to be taken of the new regulatory
and supervisory set-up in the EU as a result of
the extension of the “Lamfalussy framework”
to the banking sector. Second, the specific
features of the European financial system, such
as the role of the Single Market, justify some
deviations.
1 In this paper, the term “bank” is used as a synonym for
“credit institution”.
2 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004a).
3 Art. 105(5) of the Treaty establishing the European
Community.
4 See in this respect ECB (2005a).
5 See in particular ECB (2005b).8
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This paper is structured in two main parts. The
first one deals with the Basel Framework and
its implementation in the EU and the second one
addresses certain topics that are particularly
important in the EU context. In Part I, Section 1
briefly recalls the main steps that were taken in
finalising the Basel II Framework and Section
2 provides an overview of its main elements. In
Section 3, the EU implementation of Basel II is
discussed in general terms. It starts by recalling
the specific legal and institutional setting in the
EU and then turns to the main differences
between the Basel and the EU rules.
Part II builds on this general analysis and
singles out a number of areas, which are of
particular relevance for the EU, and
investigates them in greater detail. Section 4
tackles the issue of procyclicality, i.e. the
concern that the new capital rules may
exacerbate economic cycles. It reviews the
empirical evidence, the different measures to
mitigate such effects and the specific
monitoring arrangement provided for under the
EU rules. Implementation issues in a cross-
border context are analysed in Section 5. Here,
the EU rules diverge from Basel by enhancing
the role of the authority responsible for
supervision on a consolidated basis. Section 6
compares the EU and Basel rules in their
treatment of real estate collateral, both for
residential and commercial real estate lending.
The treatment of covered bonds, a financing
instrument that is particularly popular in the
EU, is dealt with in Section 7. The paper
concludes by giving a future outlook as Basel II
and its implementation in the EU represent very
important steps in a longer term process, but
not its end.
PART 1 – OVERVIEW OF THE NEW FRAMEWORK
1 DEVELOPMENT
With its New Framework for capital
requirements, the BCBS aims to alleviate some
of the drawbacks of the current regime dating
back to 1988 (“Basel I”).6 First, the current
Basel I rules offer a simplified and rigid
quantification of credit risk, that are not in line
with best practices applied by banks in their
risk management. Basel II significantly refines
the framework’s risk sensitivity by requiring
higher levels of capital for high-risk borrowers.
By aligning required capital more closely to a
bank’s own risk estimates, the New Framework
narrows the gap between regulatory capital and
economic capital (requirements).7 It therefore
encourages banks to improve their risk
assessment methods. Furthermore, the
increasing use of risk mitigation and
securitisation has created the need to treat them
more extensively. Another drawback of the
current framework stems from its unintended
incentives for capital arbitrage through
techniques such as securitisation. In addition,
the current framework lacks rules for proper
market disclosure and therefore does not
support market discipline. Finally, it offers no
guidance for the supervisory review of banks’
risk management practices.
Work on the New Framework started after 1996
when the Capital Accord underwent a major
amendment to introduce capital requirements for
market risk.8 At the current juncture, full
implementation of the Basel II Framework is
expected for the end of 2007. The whole process,
therefore, from the initiation of discussions to
the moment when the most advanced calculation
methods will become available, will have
stretched out over more than a decade.
Box 1 lists the key development stages and
the next steps in the implementation. The
development process was characterised by an
intensive dialogue with the banking industry,
reflected in the various consultation papers
published by the BCBS. The Basel Committee
also carried out several quantitative impact
6 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1988). Basel I is
also called the “Basel Capital Accord”.
7 Regulatory capital is capital that is eligible to meet
regulatory capital requirements; economic capital is capital
held by the bank internally as a result of its own risk
assessment. Technical terms are explained in the glossary at
the end of the paper.
8 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996).9
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CHRONOLOGY OF THE BASEL PROCESS
June 1999 First Consultation Paper (CP1)
July 2000 Quantitative Impact Study 1(QIS1)
January 2001 Second Consultation Paper (CP2)
April 2001 Quantitative Impact Study 2 (QIS2)
November 2001 Quantitative Impact Study 2.5 (QIS2.5)
October 2002 Quantitative Impact Study 3 (QIS3)
April 2003 Third Consultation Paper (CP3)
2004/2005 Quantitative Impact Studies 4 and 5 (QIS4/5)
January 2004 “Madrid compromise”
June 2004 Publication of the “New Framework” document
April 2005 Consultation on the trading book review and double default
July 2005 Publication of the trading book review and double default
Spring 2006 Scheduled recalibration of the New Framework
End 2006 Scheduled G10 implementation of simpler methods
End 2007 Scheduled G10 implementation of advanced methods
studies to gauge the impact of the new rules on
banks’ solvency positions and further refine the
rules.
Basel II has been designed as an evolutionary
framework, so updates will be made over time
to keep pace with ongoing developments in the
financial industry. Prior to the implementation
of the new rules, the Framework may undergo a
quantitative adjustment (“recalibration”) on
the basis of the results of the most recent impact
studies. In addition, some technical changes
were introduced after June 2004 to address the
“double default” issue and to bring the
treatment of trading activities more in line with
the New Framework.9 In the longer term, the
BCBS intends to address a number of other
areas which are discussed in greater detail in
the last section dealing with the future outlook.
2 STRUCTURE
2.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW
An overview of the New Framework and its
main components is shown in Chart 1. The dark
boxes, which will be discussed in greater detail
below, refer to the components that have been
introduced or to which there are major changes
as a result of the new rules; the bright boxes
refer to the components that have remained
unchanged. Whereas Basel I only covered
minimum capital requirements, the Basel II
Framework now rests on three complementary
pillars, namely minimum capital requirements
(Pillar I), the supervisory review process
(Pillar II) and market discipline (Pillar III). In
order to effectively support financial stability,
the Framework requires a smooth interaction
between all three pillars.
As regards Pillar I, the minimum solvency ratio
of 8% remains unchanged. This ratio expresses
the relationship between the bank’s regulatory
own funds (capital) and its “risk-weighted
assets”, a measure of the risks it incurs. Risk-
weighted assets are asset values multiplied by a
factor (risk weight) that is a proxy of the (credit)
risk related to these assets. For operational risk
and market risk, the two other risk categories
9 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005b). “Double
default” refers to the fact that the risk of both a borrower and
a guarantor defaulting on the same obligation may be
substantially lower than the risk of only one of the parties
defaulting; this feature is not sufficiently recognised in the
June 2004 Framework.10
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Chart 1 Overview of the New Framework
covered by the Framework, the risk-weighted
assets that enter into the capital ratio are derived
from the directly calculated capital requirements
by multiplying them by 12.5 (the reciprocal of
the minimum ratio of 8%). In addition, the
definition of regulatory capital (the numerator of
the capital ratio) was basically unaffected.
Pillar I, however, provides a fundamental update
of the Basel I methodology for the calculation of
risk weighed assets, the denominator of the
capital ratio. First, operational risk is introduced
as a new risk category for which the bank has to
hold regulatory capital. This risk category
comprises losses resulting from inadequate or
failed internal processes, people or systems, or
from external events.
Second, a range of increasingly sophisticated
and risk-sensitive options are now available for
determining banks’ capital requirements, both
for credit risk and operational risk. In this way,
the option can be chosen that best suits the bank’s
specific features. Moreover, incentives are in
place for banks to adopt the more sophisticated
approaches and thus improve their risk
management capabilities over time.10 In the area
of credit risk, two methods are available, namely
the standardised approach and the internal
ratings-based (IRB) approach. The former ties
risk weights to ratings provided by recognised
rating agencies. The latter uses banks’ own
estimates of certain risk factors; depending on
the risk factors they are allowed to estimate, a
distinction is made between a “foundation” and
an “advanced” approach. The new rules for credit
risk also cover a detailed treatment of
securitisation and credit risk mitigation. Finally,
in the area of operational risk, a bank can
10 For example the QIS3 results for the EU showed that
institutions adopting the standardised approach would face
an increase in capital requirements of 2%, while those
adopting the foundation IRB and the advanced IRB
approaches would see a decline of 7% and 9% respectively.
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2 STRUCTURE
calculate its capital requirements on the basis of
its gross income (basic indicator approach and
standardised approach) or by using its own
model (advanced measurement approach). As
regards market risk, the New Framework leaves
the existing approaches basically unchanged.
2.2 PILLAR I – MINIMUM CAPITAL
REQUIREMENTS
2.2.1 CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CREDIT
RISK
(a) Standardised approach
The standardised approach is closest to the
present capital rules. Exposures are classified
into a set of standardised asset classes (see
Chart 2) and a risk weight is applied to each
class, reflecting the relative degree of credit
risk. As under Basel I, off-balance sheet
exposures are for capital purposes transformed
into “assets” through the application of “credit
conversion factors”. The main changes
compared to Basel I relate to the use of external
credit ratings as the basis for determining the
risk weights and the greater differentiation in
the possible risk weights.
Chart 2 Asset classes in the standardised approach
To give an example, risk weights for corporate
exposures are now connected with their credit
ratings as indicated in Table 1 (for illustrative
purposes, ratings by Standard & Poor’s or S&P
are used).
Compared to Basel I, where all corporate
exposures are weighted at 100%, there is now a
considerable differentiation in the risk weights.
The weight for investment-grade firms has
declined considerably (e.g. to 20 % for AAA),
whereas in the non-investment grade segment, a
risk weight of 150% applies to firms rated below
“BB-”. Furthermore, unrated firms now obtain
the same risk weight as that formerly obtained by
all corporates under Basel I.
For claims on banks, the former distinction
between institutions from OECD (20% risk
weight) and non-OECD countries (100%) is no
longer applied. Instead, two options are
available to national supervisors. Under the
first option, the risk weights for banks are
derived from the ratings of the country in which
the bank is incorporated. Under the second
option, the risk weights are determined on the
basis of the bank’s own rating.
Rating AAA to AA- A+ to A- BBB+ to BB- Below BB- Unrated
Risk weight 20 50 100 150 100
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Retail exposures (75% instead of 100%) and
mortgage loans (35% instead of 50%) are
treated more advantageously than under
Basel I. Exposures to small businesses may
under certain conditions also benefit from the
preferred retail treatment.
The rating agencies, or external credit
assessment institutions (ECAIs) as they are
referred to in the New Framework, must obtain
recognition from the banking supervisor before
their ratings can be used by banks for
determining risk weights. To get such
recognition, an ECAI must satisfy each of the
following six criteria:
1. Objectivity  of the rating or credit risk
assessment methodology.
2. Independence. The ECAI must be free from
political or economic pressures, which
could influence the analysis.
3. International access/transparency. The
ECAI should offer its services to both
domestic and foreign firms at similar terms.
4. Disclosure of material information.
Includes the rating methodology, the
definition of default, the time horizon, the
meaning of each rating, the actual default
rates experienced in each assessment
category and the transition matrix.11
5. Sufficient resources for offering credit
assessments of high quality.
6. Credibility of the credit assessments.
(b) Internal ratings-based approach
Theoretical foundation
The internal ratings-based (IRB) approach to
credit risk is one of the most innovative
elements of the New Framework because it
allows banks themselves to determine certain
key elements in the calculation of their capital
requirements. Hence, the risk weights – and
thus the capital charges – are determined
through a combination of quantitative inputs
provided either by banks or supervisory
authorities, and risk weight functions specified
by the BCBS. The new methodology is
designed to be suitable for implementation by
banks of different size, business structure and
risk profile. Due to this characteristic, a
standardised approach to modelling credit risk
across all types of banks is used for supervisory
purposes for the first time.
The IRB approach is closely linked to key
results of academic work on credit risk
modelling.12 Its theoretical basis is the
asymptotic single risk factor (ASRF) model of
credit risk. Here, the likelihood of a borrower
being unable to repay his debt is derived from
the distance between the value of its assets and
the nominal amount of his debt. The value of
the firm’s assets is modelled as a variable
which changes over time, in part as a result of
the impact of random shocks. Default occurs
when a borrower’s assets are too low to cover
its debt. The corresponding measure of credit
risk within a certain time frame (commonly set
at one year, also in Basel II) is the probability
of default (PD).
The ASRF characteristic of the model implies
that it does not take into account borrower-
specific idiosyncratic risks, i.e. risks that can
be diversified away in the lending bank’s loan
portfolio. Instead, the model measures the
marginal risk contribution of an exposure that
it would add to an already well diversified
portfolio. In this respect the IRB approach
differs from models that some banks apply
internally which measure a loan’s risk
contribution to a bank’s actual portfolio,
inclusive of a potential additional
diversification effect achieved by adding an
exposure to this specific borrower (“credit risk
portfolio model”). The IRB approach therefore
contains a deliberate simplification compared
11 The transition matrix provides a distribution of the likely
changes in a borrower’s credit quality (expressed by its
rating) over a certain time period, usually fixed at one year.
12 Details on the theoretical background are given in Basel
Committee on Banking (2005a) and Gordy (2003).13
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2 STRUCTURE
with the most advanced techniques currently
applied. This simplification allows for a model
that is standardised and can be applied
uniformly to banks of different sizes and
portfolio compositions. It also avoids the
particular uncertainties connected with the
estimation of correlations between the risks of
individual borrowers.
Under the IRB approach, the required
minimum capital is based on the probability
distribution of losses due to the default risk in a
portfolio of loans or other financial
instruments. The horizon of the risk assessment
is set at one year. The IRB model further
assumes a 99.9% confidence level. This means
that once in a thousand years, the actual loss is
expected to exceed the model’s estimate.
Designed to address unexpected losses
As a result of the agreement reached by the
BCBS in January 2004 with the “Madrid
compromise”, the IRB capital requirements
now cover only unexpected losses whereas
previously they were designed to cover both
expected and unexpected losses. Unexpected
losses are losses that occur above expected
levels and this at a certain confidence level
(99.9%). Although capital requirements are
designed to cover unexpected losses, banks
have to cover their expected losses on an
ongoing basis, e.g. through pricing, provisions
and write-offs.
In the IRB framework, banks have to compare
the stock of provisions they have made to cover
loan losses with the expected losses based on
the IRB parameters. Any shortfall should be
deducted equally from core capital and
supplementary capital13 and any excess will be
eligible for inclusion in supplementary capital
subject to a cap. The cap depends on the risk-
weighted assets and is currently set at 0.6%.
Differentiated according to asset classes
Just like the standardised approach, the IRB
approach distinguishes between asset classes
(see Chart 3) to which different supervisory
risk weight functions apply. Details on the
capital requirements for standard corporate
loans are provided below. The retail portfolio is
of considerable importance because it also
Chart 3 Asset classes in the internal ratings-based approach
13 Core capital or Tier 1 capital consists of own funds
components of the highest quality, such as fully-paid capital
and disclosed reserves from post-tax retained earnings.
Supplementary capital or Tier 2/Tier 3 capital consists of
own funds components of lower quality, such as certain types
of subordinated debt.
Source: ECB.
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Chart 4 Basic structure of the internal ratings-based approach
applies to a sizeable fraction of lending to small
firms. Subject to certain conditions, the New
Framework permits aggregate exposures to a
single firm of up to €1 million to be treated
under the IRB approach as retail exposures,
which is advantageous compared to the
treatment of other corporate lending. Even
loans to other small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) that do not qualify as
“retail” can benefit from a preferential
treatment based on an adjustment relative to the
firm’s size under the standard corporate
treatment. This reduction applies when the
firm’s total sales are between €5 million and
€50 million and its impact declines in
proportion to the sales. Economically, the firm
size adjustment can be justified by the fact that
default probabilities for smaller firms are
observed to be less correlated with the overall
state of the economy so that they contribute
relatively less risk to a well diversified loan
portfolio.
Calculation method
The calculation of capital requirements for a
loan’s default risk under Basel II requires four
input parameters to the supervisory risk weight
functions (see Chart 4):
1. Probability of default (PD): Estimate of the
likelihood of the borrower defaulting on his
obligations within one year.
2. Loss given default (LGD): Loss on the
exposure following the borrower’s default,
commonly expressed as a percentage of the
debt’s original nominal value.
3. Exposure at default (EAD): Nominal value
of the borrower’s outstanding debt.
4. Effective maturity of the loan (M).
A “foundation” and an “advanced” version of
the IRB approach is available, the difference in
the two approaches being in the input variables
for which the bank can use its own estimates.
Both approaches rely on banks’ PD estimates,
but banks’ internal estimates of LGD, EAD and










1) To be estimated by the bank under the foundation variant; for the other risk factors, a value fixed by the BCBS has to be used. For
the advanced variant, all four risk factors have to be estimated by the bank. In principle, both the foundation and the advanced IRB
approaches are available for all asset classes, the exception being the retail class, where only the advanced version is available.15
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2 STRUCTURE
The resulting risk weights are plotted in Chart 5
with the PDs shown on the horizontal axis. As
designed by the BCBS, the capital charge for
retail portfolios is significantly below the
charge for corporate loans. This difference is of
considerable importance as it indicates that a
large number of small borrowers, including
small commercial undertakings, will benefit
from a more favourable capital treatment than
larger corporate borrowers.
A particular aim of the BCBS is to preserve
overall capital neutrality compared to the
current capital requirements, i.e. the capital
required from an average bank should not differ
markedly under the current Accord and Basel
II. To this end, the BCBS had introduced into
the IRB formula a multiplier which is currently
set at 1.06 (not reflected in Chart 5). This value
is based on the studies that the BCBS has
performed so far on the overall impact of the
new requirements. With future assessments of
the quantitative impact of the new capital rules,
the issue of capital neutrality may have to be re-
addressed. This multiplier provides then for a
simple way to adjust the overall level of capital
required from IRB banks.
Practical implementation
The use of the IRB approach is subject to an
explicit supervisory approval, which depends
on meeting certain minimum requirements
from the outset and on an ongoing basis. These
requirements are aimed at the IRB system
providing an adequate assessment of the bank’s
exposures, a meaningful differentiation of risk
and a reasonably good estimate of risk. For
example, a qualifying IRB system is required to
have two separate dimensions, the risk of
borrower default and transaction-specific
factors (e.g. collateral, seniority, product
type). The IRB approach must also be
consistent with the internal use by the bank of
the estimates it produces (“use test”).
In the practical implementation of the IRB
system, validation (the assessment of the
soundness of the different system elements)
will be important. In this context, the Accord
Implementation Group (AIG) of the BCBS
has outlined a number of principles.14 First,
validation is interpreted as an assessment of the
predictive ability of a bank’s risk estimates and
the use of ratings in the credit process. In
addition, the bank has primary responsibility
for validation. Furthermore, validation of the
IRB approaches should encompass both
quantitative and qualitative elements. Finally,
validation processes and outcomes should be
subject to an independent review.
(c) Asset securitisation
Securitisation is one of the most rapidly
growing activities of major banks. Banks
increasingly apply it to pools of loans on their
balance sheets. In parallel, other credit
instruments such as corporate bonds are
increasingly used as underlying assets for
securitisation transactions. With the explicit
treatment of securitisation, Basel II provides
for an internationally harmonised standard for
the supervisory treatment of such transactions.
At the same time, by making the capital
requirements depend on the risk in the
14 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005c).
Chart 5 IRB risk weights across asset classes
(percentages)
Source: ECB.
Note: Standard assumptions about the risk factors other than
PD, are made. Risk weights are calibrated to cover only
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securitisation positions, Basel II aims at
reducing the scope for capital arbitrage, a key
drawback of the current framework and
apparently an important securitisation driver.
Pillar I contains detailed rules for the
supervisory treatment of securitisation, which
cover the two roles a bank can play in a
securitisation transaction, namely as originator
and investor. In the first case, the bank
securitises its own assets; in the second case, it
buys and holds tranches of securitisations.
Basel II deals with traditional transactions,
e.g. the sale of loans through asset backed
securities, as well as synthetic securitisations,
such as the transfer of credit risk through credit
derivatives without selling the loans.
Just as for credit risk, a number of approaches
of different complexity are introduced to deal
with the wide variety in instruments and degree
of sophistication of the bank. Also here, a
standardised and an IRB approach are
available. The structure of the standardised
approach for securitisation exposures is similar
to the standardised approach for credit risk,
although tranches that carry a higher risk or are
unrated are dealt with more conservatively
(higher risk weight or capital deduction).
Banks which were given supervisory approval
to use the IRB approach for the type of
underlying exposures securitised must also
apply the IRB methodology to securitisation.
However, instead of a foundation and
advanced approach, there are now three
ways of calculating capital requirements:
the (external) ratings-based approach, the
supervisory formula approach and the internal
assessment approach. The first is similar to the
standardised approach, although a greater risk
differentiation is provided for. The next two
approaches apply to unrated exposures, and
the third only to the specific case of
exposures resulting from ABCP (asset backed
commercial paper) programmes.
(d) Credit risk mitigation
Compared with the current Capital Accord, the
New Framework contains a wider range of
credit risk mitigation techniques that may
receive recognition in the form of lower capital
requirements, subject to prudent eligibility
standards. For credit risk mitigation in the form
of guarantees and credit derivatives, the
borrower’s risk weight is replaced by that
of the protection provider. This “substitution
approach” was recently modified by the BCBS
to take account of the pair-wise correlation of
the borrower and protection provider’s default
probabilities.15
For collateralised exposures, the Framework
comprises a range of methodologies that are of
different degrees of sophistication. In general,
the more sophisticated the methodology and
the more stringent the application conditions,
the wider the range of eligible collateral.
Compared to Basel I, the range of eligible
collateral has also been expanded.
Banks using the standardised approach can
apply the “simple method” for financial
collateral under which the risk weight of the
borrower is replaced by the risk weight that
would apply to the collateral if it were the
exposure. Under both the standardised and the
foundation IRB approaches, there is also a
“comprehensive method” for financial
collateral that foresees that the exposure
amount under the standardised approach, or the
supervisory LGD under the foundation IRB, is
reduced to reflect the adjusted value of the
collateral. In adjusting the collateral value,
banks have to take account of the volatility of
its market value. A specific feature of the
foundation IRB is the presence of a supervisory
method for the recognition of certain physical
collateral.
For banks using the advanced IRB, the range of
admissible collateral is unbounded as long as
the bank can demonstrate that it has good
estimates for the collateral value in the
15 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005b).17
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situation when the borrower has defaulted.
While under the standardised approach there is
in principle no recognition of physical
collateral, real estate collateral is an exception.
Also under the foundation IRB approach, there
are particular conditions that need to be
observed for this kind of collateral, as
discussed in greater detail in Section 6.
2.2.2 CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
OPERATIONAL RISK
Operational risk has so far not been subject to
capital requirements. However, this does not
imply that adding this new component to
regulatory capital leads for an average bank to
higher overall requirements. Rather, the
additional requirement for operational risk
corresponds on average to lower capital
requirements for credit risk compared with the
current rules so that the BCBS goal of capital
neutrality can on balance be reached. For
operational risk, three options of different
levels of sophistication are introduced.
The two most simple options are based on an
indicator, namely gross income, which serves
as a rough proxy for the size and the degree of
risk of the operations. For this purpose, gross
income is defined as the sum of net interest
income and net non-interest income. Fees paid
to outsourcing providers are not deducted from
the income because it was considered that
outsourcing is not a perfect mitigant for
operational risk and should therefore not lead
to lower capital requirements. Gross income is
also adjusted for a number of items that are
considered irregular and is in addition
smoothed by using a three-year average,
excluding negative annual figures. This
indicator, multiplied with a supervisory factor,
delivers the capital requirement.
Under the basic indicator approach, the
supervisory factor (called “alpha”) is applied
to the total gross income. Under the
standardised approach, the gross income is
split out over eight different business lines,
namely corporate finance, trading and sales,
retail banking, commercial banking, payment
and settlement, agency services, asset
management, and retail brokerage. To each
business line a different supervisory factor
(called “beta”) is applied, reflecting the
relative risk of the business line according to
the BCBS’ expert judgment. The average beta
equals the alpha so that clear incentives to
adopt the standardised rather than the basic
indicator approach are only present for those
banks that derive most of their gross income
from business lines with low betas, such as
retail banking. Banks that want to use the
standardised approach have to implement a risk
management for operational risk that conforms
to a number of qualitative minimum
requirements; such requirements are not
mandatory for banks using the basic indicator
approach.
In contrast to the case of the IRB as the most
advanced approach for credit risk, the BCBS
does not resort to a single modelling technique
for operational risk. Rather, the most advanced
option for determining regulatory capital for
operational risk consists of a class of
approaches referred to as the advanced
measurement approaches (AMA). Under the
AMA, the regulatory capital requirement is
calculated on the basis of banks’ internal
operational risk measurement systems. These
have to take account not only of actual internal
and external loss data, but also of scenario
analyses and factors relating to the banks’
business environment and internal controls.
Furthermore, the model has to achieve a
statistical soundness standard comparable to
that of the IRB approach, where capital charges
are based upon a one-year time horizon and a
99.9% confidence level, as described above.
Subject to compliance with these model
properties, banks are free to develop their own
approach. This freedom is explained by the fact
that, until now, no reliable candidate for a
standard operational risk model has been
identified.
In addition to the soundness standards for the
model itself, banks that request approval from
their supervisors for their AMA have to comply18
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with minimum requirements on their
operational risk management that are more
demanding than for the standardised approach.
By taking into account banks’ business
environment and internal controls, banks under
the AMA are in principle able to mitigate their
operational risk capital charge by improving
their operational risk management, for instance
by introducing enhanced controls into the
business process. However, many open
methodological questions still remain with
respect to how this can be done in a sound and
practical manner. Banks are also allowed to
recognise insurance as a risk mitigant for up to
20% of their AMA capital requirements; the
condition is that their insurance contracts and
providers meet certain eligibility standards.
In the context of operational risk capital
requirements, the study by De Fontnouvelle et
al. (2004) is of considerable importance. Using
loss data from a number of internationally
active banks, the authors find that loss data by
event types are quite similar across
institutions. They also show that their results
are consistent with economic capital numbers
disclosed by some large banks, and with the
results of studies modelling losses using
publicly available “external” loss data.
2.3 PILLAR II – SUPERVISORY REVIEW
PROCESS
Under Pillar II, banks assess their capital
adequacy on the basis of own internal risk
management methodology and supervisors
analyse whether a specific bank’s capital
adequacy assessment is in line with its overall
risk profile and business strategies. A
consistent application of supervisory practices
across countries is of great importance to avoid
any undue compliance burden and to ensure a
level playing-field. This is particularly true if
banks belonging to the same group aim to make
use of group-wide risk management but face
different expectations from their respective
national supervisory authorities. Convergence
and cooperation in supervisory practices may
constitute a way to alleviate this concern. The
extended role for the authority that exercises
consolidated supervision, as provided for in the
proposed EU rules, deserves particular
attention in this regard (see Section 5).
Under the supervisory review process, the
question will also be addressed whether the
bank should hold additional capital against
risks that are not, or not fully, covered in Pillar
I, and this may involve supervisory action
when this is indeed the case. An active role for
supervisory authorities will give banks
incentives to continuously improve their risk
management models and systems. Relative to
the present situation, Pillar II requires
supervisors to apply considerably more
discretion in their assessment of capital
adequacy in individual banks.
The supervisory review process relies on four
principles:
1. Banks should have a process for assessing
their overall capital adequacy in relation to
their risk profile and a strategy for
maintaining capital levels.
2. Supervisors should review and evaluate
banks’ internal capital adequacy
assessments and strategies, as well as their
ability to monitor and ensure compliance
with regulatory capital ratios. If they are not
satisfied with the result of this process,
supervisors should take appropriate action.
3. Supervisors should expect banks to operate
above the minimum regulatory capital ratios
and should have the ability to require banks to
hold capital in excess of the minimum.
4. Supervisors should seek to intervene at an
early stage to prevent capital from falling
below the minimum levels required to
support the risk characteristics of a bank and
should require rapid remedial action if
capital is not maintained or restored.
The BCBS has outlined some important issues
to which both banks and supervisors should19
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devote attention in the supervisory review
process. These issues also include risk
categories which are not directly addressed
under Pillar I, such as interest rate risk in the
banking book16 and credit concentration risk.
Interest rate risk in the banking book has been
given specific attention because it is seen by
regulators as a material risk in the banking
system. Although the market risk amendment
of 1996 introduced interest rate risk as a
separate category, it was aimed at the
exposures in the trading book. Hence, the 1996
modification focused on the risk of losses
arising from, for example, bond portfolios or
other categories of fixed-income instruments
held for trading. The BCBS acknowledged this
gap in the treatment of losses coming from
sharp interest rate changes. While it did not add
a separate capital requirement, wording has
been included under Pillar II that requires
supervisors to identify those banks as outliers
that would experience a loss amounting to more
than 20% of their capital from a simulated
standardised interest rate shock. Supervisory
authorities must take measures to address the
situation of such outlier banks.
As regards the treatment of credit
concentration risk, there are two
complementary motivations. First, several
banking crises have been clearly linked to
material risk concentrations in bank portfolios.
Second, the ASRF model, which is the basis for
the IRB approach, relies on two assumptions
about a significant diversification in bank
portfolios. First, the ASRF assumes that no
borrower accounts for more than a very small
share of total portfolio exposure. Second, it
assumes that banks are well diversified across
geographical areas and industrial sectors
within a large economy. Both assumptions may
be valid for the majority of exposures of some
of the larger banks, but in the EU, the IRB
approach is likely to also be applied to smaller
banks, where concentration of exposure to
individual borrowers or certain sectors may be
more substantial. In this context, it should be
recalled that the rules on large exposures in the
Codified Banking Directive (2000/12/EC)
already serve to limit single-name
concentration risk. Theoretical analysis has
shown that a ratings-based approach to setting
capital requirements needs the two
aforementioned assumptions, at least
implicitly. Therefore, the concentration
problem cannot be addressed merely by
modifications to the IRB risk-weights. Hence,
under Pillar II, supervisors will analyse
potential risk concentrations and may also
potentially develop appropriate Pillar II capital
buffers against such risk concentrations.
2.4 PILLAR III – MARKET DISCIPLINE
Under Pillar III, banks will be required to
publish information focused on the key
parameters of their business profile, risk
exposure and risk management. Such
disclosures are seen as a precondition for the
effective working of market discipline on
banks. For banking groups, the requirements
apply to the top consolidated level of the
banking group.
Both qualitative and quantitative information
must be disclosed. Hence, disclosure is
required on the structure and adequacy of
capital, and should therefore include details on
the core capital. It is envisaged that credit,
market and operational risk are addressed
separately. For the disclosure of credit risk, it is
also planned to publish data on the portfolio
structure, the major types of credit exposure,
the geographical and sectoral distribution and
impaired loans. In addition, information on
credit risk mitigation techniques and asset
securitisation has to be provided. Banks will be
required to outline some details on their use of
IRB approaches, which represent a major
component of the New Framework. Regarding
market risk, banks have to summarise the key
16 The banking book is the bank portfolio which consists of
financial instruments that are not held for trading. The
trading book is the bank portfolio that consists of financial
instruments that are held for short-term trading purposes, i.e.
they are held intentionally for short-term resale and/or with
the intent of benefiting from short-term price movements or
to lock in arbitrage profits.20
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details of their internal models where
applicable and to describe their use of stress
testing and back testing. Disclosure
requirements further cover the management of
and the compliance with requirements on
operational risk. Finally, the New Framework
requires that information on equity holdings
and interest rate risk in the banking book to be
published.
3 THE NEW FRAMEWORK IN THE EU
3.1 LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
One month after the BCBS published its
document on the New Framework, the
European Commission released its own
proposals on new capital requirements for
banks and investment firms in the EU.17 The
proposals reflected to a large extent Basel II,
but were at the same time tailored to the
specific features of the EU market. The
Commission’s initiative is part of the wider
Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP)
launched in 1999. The FSAP outlined a number
of policy objectives and measures to improve
the Single Market for financial services. One of
its objectives was to ensure financial stability
by keeping pace with state-of-the-art
prudential rules and supervision, in particular
in the area of banks’ solvency requirements.
The Single Market is an important factor that
explains why in some cases the proposed EU
rules go further than the Basel rules.
Thereafter, the Commission’s proposals have
been subject to scrutiny by the European
Parliament and the Council and to tripartite
negotiations with the Commission. These
negotiations resulted in a package of almost
600 amendments, subject to which both the
Parliament and Council approved the proposals
in September and October 2005. In this way,
they cleared the way for the new capital
requirements to enter into force in the EU as
scheduled by the BCBS.
Although there are a large number of
amendments, they leave the content and thrust
of the Commission’s proposals intact. The
amendments introduce the trading book review
and double default treatment as released by the
BCBS in July 2005, reduce the number of
national discretions, make some minor
technical corrections and take account of
several specific concerns relating to Member
States’ national markets. Finally, the
amendments also provide a preliminary
solution to the long debated issue of
institutional balance in the “comitology”
procedure as part of the Lamfalussy approach,
which is discussed in more detail below.
An important distinguishing feature of the
implementation of the Basel rules in the
European Union is the legal nature of the
capital adequacy framework. While the Basel
II Framework takes the form of an accord or
agreement amongst national banking
supervisors represented in the BCBS – thus
implementation remains in principle voluntary
– in the EU, the framework is legislative and
binding in all EU Member States. The Basel II
Framework will be transposed into EU
legislation by means of the Capital
Requirements Directive (CRD). Technically,
this has been done via a recasting of the
existing Codified Banking Directive or CBD
(2000/12/EC) and the Capital Adequacy
Directive or CAD (93/6/EEC). The re-casting
technique, established by the interinstitutional
agreement 2002/C77/01 of 28 November 2002,
allows the incorporation in current legislative
texts of both amended and unchanged
provisions.
Another significant element is the regulatory
and supervisory setting that is now in place
in the EU as a result of the “Lamfalussy”
approach (see Box 2). This approach was
initially applied to the securities sector18 but
17 European Commission Services (2004).
18 The Lamfalussy approach was set out by the Committee of
Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets,
chaired by Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy, in its “Final
Report” dated 15 February 2001.21
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was later extended to all financial sectors,
including banking. It was introduced with the
aim of improving the speed and flexibility of
the rulemaking process, so that regulation can





Proposal for Community legislation advanced by the European Commission and adopted under
the co-decision procedure by the Council and the European Parliament. The legislation takes
the form of directives or regulations. It should be limited to framework principles and define
the powers for the Commission to implement the necessary technical rules.
Level 2
The European Commission enacts legislation containing the technical details for the
framework principles approved at Level 1. This requires the intervention of a regulatory
committee under the “comitology procedure”1. These regulatory committees are chaired by the
Commission and composed of high-level representatives from Member States. The ECB has
observer status in the banking, securities and financial conglomerates committees.
The “Level 2” regulatory committees
Banking European Banking Committee (EBC)
Securities and investment funds European Securities Committee (ESC)
Insurance and pension funds European Insurance and Occupational Pensions
Committee  (EIOPC)
Financial conglomerates European Financial Conglomerates Committee (EFCC)
Level 3
Level 3 committees are entrusted with the task of facilitating the day-to-day implementation of
Community law with the goal of converging both supervisory practices and the application of
Community legislation, and enhancing supervisory cooperation. Guidelines, interpretative
recommendations, common standards or best practices may be issued, but these are not legally
binding and implementation remains voluntary. Level 3 committees also assist the
Commission in drafting the more technical provisions of the legislation enacted at Level 2. The
supervisory committees are composed of high-level representatives from the competent
national supervisory authorities.
The “Level 3” supervisory committees
Banking Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS)
Securities and investment funds Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR)
Insurance and pension funds Committee of European Insurance and Occupational
Pensions  Supervisors (CEIOPS)
Financial conglomerates At present, there is no Level 3 committee
1 The procedure whereby the Commission is assisted by a Committee comprising representatives from Member States in the
adoption of implementing measures for Community legislation. Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the
procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission specifies the types of comitology procedures
governing the adoption of implementing measures.22
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Level 4
The European Commission is responsible for ensuring that Member States’ national law
complies with Community law and, if needed, to take enforcement action. Legal action against
Member States can be taken before the European Court of Justice. Strengthening enforcement
is underpinned by enhanced cooperation between Member States, the regulatory bodies and the
private sector.
The increased flexibility of the legislative
process envisaged by the Lamfalussy approach
is reflected in the CRD transposing the
capital requirements into EU law. Whereas
amendments to the main principles still have to
be made via co-decision, amendments to the
more technical provisions can be introduced
via the more flexible and faster “comitology”
procedure. However, the CRD is not a
pure “Lamfalussy directive” as it combines
both framework principles and technical
implementation rules in the same legal
instrument.
The issue of “comitology” and the institutional
balance between Parliament, Commission and
Council was long debated given that the current
procedure does not grant the Parliament the
right to “call back” the “comitology” powers of
the Commission, although such a right was
intended to be introduced as part of the
Constitutional Treaty. A last minute
compromise between Commission, Council
and Parliament as part of the above-mentioned
amendments means that the current comitology
system – which provides no formal “call-back”
right for Parliament – can be used to implement
and update the Directives for a maximum of
two years or until 1 April 2008 at the latest.
After this period, aforementioned powers
can be renewed only with the agreement of the
three institutions. This timeframe should allow
for reflection on a possible recalibration as
scheduled by the BCBS for Spring 2006.
The implementation of the New Framework
represented in principle a “window of
opportunity” to structure the new rules along
the lines of what had been introduced for the
securities sector. This would have entailed a
clear distinction between framework principles
(Level 1 acts) and technical implementation
rules (Level 2 acts), with the adoption of
regulations for the latter, whenever
appropriate. In general, recourse to regulations
would reinforce convergent implementation
across the EU, given that they are directly
applicable in all Member States, as opposed to
directives, which need to be transposed into
national law. This in turn would facilitate
compliance by cross-border groups and
contribute to promoting a level playing-field
and further integration. This opportunity was
not exploited and hence, the current legal
framework should be viewed as a first step in a
longer term process where the ultimate goal
would be to arrive at a uniform and directly
applicable set of European rules for financial
institutions.
Regulatory convergence and a consistent
implementation of rules across Member States
are important to ensure a level playing-field in
the Single Market. However, the CRD still
includes several national discretions, meaning
that the scope for potential divergent national
implementation is considerable. In addition, the
use of terms that are not clearly defined provides
national authorities with considerable leeway,
which may also result in significantly different
interpretations. In this respect, the work by the
Level 3 banking committee – the CEBS – is
crucial. The CEBS has given priority to the
identification and reduction of national options.
The progress achieved thus far by the CEBS is
reflected in the final CRD text and must be
acknowledged, while the pursuit of more work
in this field should be strongly encouraged. As
the EU financial systems become increasingly
more integrated, some of the remaining national23
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discretions may become obsolete over time,
necessitating further revisions.
Furthermore, in its work on supervisory
convergence regarding the new capital rules,
the CEBS is focusing on a number of important
areas.19 Foremost is the development of a
common reporting framework for the new
solvency ratio, which is especially important
for cross-border banking groups that are
presently confronted with a variety of national
reporting schemes. The CEBS is also working
on guidance for the supervisory review
process, which comprises the bank’s internal
capital adequacy process and the supervisory
review and evaluation process. As regards the
standardised approach, a common approach is
underway for the recognition of external credit
assessment institutions (ECAIs), as well as for
developing the criteria to transform (“map”)
ratings into risk weights. For the advanced
calculation methods, a common approach to
validation principles is being defined. Another
important task is to foster cooperation between
home and host authorities. Finally, the CRD
not only provides for disclosure by banks but
also by supervisors, for which the CEBS is
establishing a common framework.
3.2 SPECIFIC FEATURES OF EU
IMPLEMENTATION
The implementation of the new capital rules in
Europe will not fully mirror the Basel II
Framework; rather the EU rules have been
adapted in order to reflect the specific Single
Market context, which encompasses such
features as the single banking licence, home
country control and minimum harmonisation of
prudential requirements. The main specificities
of the European setting that have been taken into
account when developing the EU rules are
presented below.
(a) Scope of application
One of the main diverging aspects concerns
the scope of application of the rules. Just like
Basel I, the Basel II Framework is envisaged
to apply only to internationally active banks. The
European implementation of the capital
requirements, by contrast, will in principle apply
to all banks and investment firms,20 independent
of their size or the geographical scope of their
activity. Financial institutions dealing in the
same activity or providing similar services will
therefore be subject to the same capital
requirements, thus ensuring a level playing-field
within the EU. In this respect, it should be
recalled that following the CAD, banks and
investment firms in the EU are already subject to
the same capital rules. This similar treatment is
rooted in the fact that the CBD allows the
universal banking model, i.e. the combination of
banking and securities activities in the same
legal entity or within the same financial group.
Another difference in the scope of application
is the level at which the new rules apply. The
Basel II rules apply to internationally active
banks at every layer of the banking group on
a (sub)consolidated basis. No general explicit
capital requirements are formulated for
individual banks, but when an entity of the
group itself qualifies as an internationally
active bank, the Basel II capital requirements
must also be met by this entity. The EU rules,
by contrast, apply in principle both on a
consolidated and an individual (solo) basis.
However, subject to certain conditions, the
CRD contains the possibility to waive the solo
requirements on (only) domestic subsidiaries.
The conditions for this waiver are aimed at
ensuring that the parent guarantees the
commitments of the subsidiary that has been
exempted from the solo capital requirements.
(b) Range of available approaches
The full spectrum of approaches for the
calculation of capital requirements as
envisaged by the Basel II Framework, from the
simple methods to those based on internal
19 This is reflected in the different Consultation Papers (CP)
released by the CEBS. See in particular the CP3 (supervisory
review process), CP4 (solvency reporting framework), CP5
(supervisory disclosure), CP7 (recognition of ECAIs), CP9
(supervisory cooperation) and CP10 (validation of advanced
calculation methods).
20 Investment firms are firms authorised under the Markets in
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), 2004/39/EC.24
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 42
December 2005
models, will be available in the EU. The
application of the New Framework in the EU to
all banks and investment firms, irrespective of
their level of complexity or sophistication,
indeed requires the full spectrum of approaches
to be available to all institutions. In this
context, it should be noted that, in the US, the
application of Basel II will only encompass the
most advanced methods (see Box 3).
The comprehensive scope of application in the
EU was also the basis for the development of
rules on “permanent partial use”. In the context
of credit risk, partial use refers to the
possibility of using the simpler standardised
approach for certain exposure classes, while
applying the more sophisticated IRB
approaches for the remaining classes. Under
Basel II, a bank using the IRB for any exposure
may only permanently apply the standardised
approach for so-called non-material exposure
classes and business lines. All other exposures
have to be treated under the IRB within a time
frame agreed with the respective supervisor
upfront (“roll out” plan). This rule aims to limit
the potential for “cherry-picking” between
approaches with different risk sensitivities.
For small EU banks, it may be particularly hard,
or even impossible, to roll out the IRB approach
to certain exposure classes where they have
a very limited number of counterparties.
Nevertheless, the exposure to these
counterparties may still be material in relation to
the bank’s overall exposures. For this reason,
there is the possibility for exposures to banks,
investment firms, sovereigns and certain other
public sector bodies to qualify for a permanent
partial use. Such exposures could then remain on
the standardised approach, independent of their
materiality, while the bank otherwise uses the
IRB approach.
The broad application in the EU of the capital
requirements framework to institutions that
range from very sophisticated internationally
active banks to less complex investment firms,
together with the potentially burdensome
overall impact of the new rules on certain
investment firms, requires that the prudential
standards be adapted. Therefore, investment
firms falling within certain categories may be
exempted by the competent authorities from
calculating capital requirements for
operational risk. Where this exemption is used,
the currently used “expenditure-based” capital
charge, that is otherwise abolished, will be
retained. Under this approach, investment
firms are required to hold minimum capital in
relation to their overhead costs.
Box 3
IMPLEMENTATION OF BASEL II IN THE US AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR EU BANKS
The US authorities decided to confine the spectrum of approaches available in the Basel II
Framework.1 Large internationally active banks (consolidated assets over USD 250 billion and
foreign exposure of at least USD 10 billion), including subsidiaries of foreign banks, will be
required to use only the advanced methodologies to calculate capital requirements. These
methods include the advanced IRB approach for credit risk and the AMA for operational risk.
Approximately ten banks fall into this category. In addition, other banks that meet the
requirements for the use of the advanced approaches will be allowed to opt into Basel II. This
will be the case for approximately another ten banks. Overall, the banks which are expected
to apply Basel II are those that are active in cross-border banking. They account for
approximately 99% of the foreign assets held by the top fifty US banking organisations and for
about two-thirds of the assets of US banks. The remaining banks (approximately 6,500) in the
1 Federal Reserve Board et al. (2003).25
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IN THE EU US and subsidiaries of foreign banks that do
not meet the criteria to adopt Basel II will
remain under the current Basel I rules.2
The implementation of Basel II in the US may
have implications for EU banks operating in the
US, especially those with a significant presence
(see chart for some examples). These banks
may be required to operate under rules that
differ from those applying to the rest of the
banking group, in particular the parent
company in the respective home country. This
can be costly and inefficient and potentially
raises negative competitive effects for
European banks. A US subsidiary of a foreign
bank has to comply with US rules, which will
entail the need for these subsidiaries to either
meet the prerequisites in order to apply the
advanced approaches of Basel II or to remain under the current Basel I based rules. Hence,
subsidiaries which would have targeted the foundation IRB will continue to apply the Basel I
rules, irrespective of whether or not the rest of the banking group applies these approaches on a
consolidated basis.
The US authorities have publicly conveyed that they would be prepared to explore the
possibility of allowing foreign subsidiaries to use conservative estimates for a transition
period.3 However, further work to develop concrete proposals still needs to be pursued. In this
context, the work of the BCBS’ Accord Implementation Group (AIG) in maintaining a level
playing-field across countries and in achieving an acceptable level of consistency in the
implementation of Basel II is of the utmost importance.
More recently, the results of the fourth quantitative impact study (QIS4) have shown a much
higher than expected capital reduction (of around 15% on aggregate and by more than 26% in
more than half of the participating banks) vis-à-vis the current level of the 26 large US financial
institutions replying to the QIS4, and also a very wide dispersion across banks (ranging from a
decrease of 47% to an increase of 56%).4
These results have prompted the US authorities to delay the scheduled publication of the Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NPR). They now plan to make the US Basel II proposal available in the
first quarter of 2006 and to introduce additional prudential safeguards to address the concerns
resulting from the QIS4. In particular, a one-year delay in the implementation will be proposed.
Further, the capital floors tied to the current Basel I rules will extend to 2011, after which they will
be reconsidered on an institution-by-institution basis.5 Given the significant implications that the
decisions by the US authorities may have in maintaining a level playing-field internationally, this
is an issue that will have to be closely monitored in the EU.
2 These rules will be revised somewhat and made more risk-sensitive. This regime is sometimes called “Basel IA”.
3 Ferguson (2003).
4 Schmidt Bies (2005) and Powell (2005).
5 Federal Reserve Board et al. (2005).
European banking groups with a significant
presence in the US
(US assets as % of total assets)
Source: ECB calculations on the basis of the 2004 annual
reports of the respective banking groups.
Note: Figures refer to North America for ABN Amro, BNP
Paribas, Deutsche Bank and HSBC; figures refer to loans/
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(c) External credit assessment institutions
External credit assessment institutions
(ECAIs) play an important role in the New
Framework as their assessments (ratings) will
be used for the calculation of the capital charge
for credit risk under the standardised approach.
In order to obtain regulatory recognition for
capital purposes, ECAIs need to comply with
minimum requirements.21 A high degree of
consistency of Member States’ practices
regarding the recognition of ECAIs will be
indispensable. In this way, comparability of
ratings and a level playing-field for ECAIs can
be ensured and the potential risks for
regulatory arbitrage reduced. Moreover,
supervisory co-operation will be crucial to
reduce the compliance costs for those ECAIs
that seek recognition in more than one Member
State.
The possibility of applying the principle of
mutual recognition to ECAIs should in that
respect be very helpful. However, whilst the
CRD only includes an option for mutual
recognition, one could argue that this should
be the general rule for ECAIs within the EU. If
a competent authority in a Member State
assesses an ECAI as complying with the
eligibility criteria, this evaluation could then
be used automatically by the competent
authorities in other Member States without
conducting any further assessment. The same
rationale applies when a competent authority
has developed a mapping for an ECAI’s ratings
on supervisory risk weights. Competent
authorities in other Member States could then
accept and use this mapping without
determining their own process.
The recognition of ECAIs for solvency
purposes is expected to influence the
availability of external ratings. This, in turn,
will have an impact on the assessment of the
eligibility of collateral for the credit operations
of the Eurosystem, which comprises the ECB
and the twelve national central banks of the
euro area, given the need for marketable debt
instruments to have a high credit standing to be
included in the list of collateral accepted.
Although the Eurosystem uses its own
assessment criteria, the eligibility criteria and
the process of recognition for supervisory
purposes will influence the quality of the
ratings and the level playing-field in the
ratings’ market.
In this context, it is important to achieve a
prudent and fair approach to supervisors’
assessment of ECAIs, especially to avoid
creating entry barriers for new market players.
For the latter, the focus should therefore be on
the evaluation of the robustness and soundness
of assessment methodologies rather than on,
for example, market acceptance or “track
record”.
(d) Supervisory disclosure
The EU capital framework introduces specific
disclosure requirements for the Member States’
competent authorities.22  These requirements,
which should be distinguished from the Pillar III
requirements that target banks’ disclosures,
were introduced with the aim of enhancing
supervisory convergence and transparency. This
innovative aspect, not mirrored in the Basel II
Framework, is expected to contribute to the
maintenance of a level playing-field and
the fostering of financial integration. The
disclosures encompass a minimum set of
requirements that range from the publication of
the legal texts and rules to the exercise of certain
discretionary measures or the choice of certain
options available in the new rules. With regard to
the exercise of effective supervision, both the
general criteria and the methodologies used
during examinations of the supervised entities
covered under the supervisory review process
should be made publicly available. Finally,
aggregate statistical data on some key
implementation aspects have to be published as
well.
(e) Private equity and venture capital
In striving to improve the competitive position
of the European economy, concerns were raised
that the new capital rules would have a negative
21 On this, see also the CP7 of the CEBS.
22 On this, see also the CP5 of the CEBS.27
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impact on the private equity and venture capital
industry, which is seen as a key driver for
economic growth. Banks in the EU play a crucial
role as the main source for this kind of financing.
Banks provide on average approximately a
quarter of the total funds raised, although there
are important differences across Member States
(see Chart 6).
The concern that the increase in risk weights
for equity investments may lead to a significant
reduction in the bank financing of investments
in private equity and venture capital triggered
additional research. The impact study carried
out in the EU on the New Framework raised the
issue that for investments in venture capital
through a diversified venture capital fund, the
risk weightings under the IRB approach
proposed by the European Commission in its
Third Consultative Proposals (CP3) were
rather high (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004).
This report recommended that the treatment of
equity exposures should consider the profile of
the investments, taking into account the degree
of diversification. This recommendation was
incorporated in the CRD. For investments in
private equity firms that constitute sufficiently
diversified portfolios, the risk weights
assigned under the IRB rules are now lower
than under the Basel II Framework. For
example, under the “simple risk weight
approach” for equity exposures, the capital
charge under the EU rules may in certain
instances be approximately 24% lower than
under Basel II.
(f) Financing of small and medium-sized
enterprises
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
play an important role in fostering economic
growth and entrepreneurship, and often act as
sub-contractors to larger firms. They use
relatively more bank financing than larger
enterprises and many of them have credit lines
with only one bank. SMEs represent more than
99% of all EU enterprises by number and about
70% of total employment (European
Commission, 2003b). These figures are
comparable to the situation in the US and
Chart 6 Share of banks in new funds raised
for private equity
(percentages; end 2004)
Source: ECB calculations on the basis of European Private
Equity and Venture Capital Association (2005).
1) LU is missing.
Japan, although in the US, SMEs account for a
much lower share of employment.
In the context of the new capital rules, there
have been concerns that quantitative rating
methods such as the IRB approach might put
more emphasis on financial ratios than on
qualitative factors such as the entrepreneur’s
ability, product ideas or business plans. In
addition, start-up companies might be at a
disadvantage as they frequently lack a rating
history. This shift in credit assessment by
banks could therefore raise the cost of credit for
SMEs and restrict the availability of their
financing. Given the importance of these firms
for the EU economy, this might ultimately have
a negative effect on economic growth,
employment and innovation. A number of
authors have studied this issue in detail, e.g.
Fabi et al. (2004) or Dietsch and Petey (2004).
In its finalisation of the new capital rules, the
BCBS made several adjustments to alleviate
these concerns. As explained in greater detail
in Section 2.2.1, under certain conditions,
exposures to small businesses can under the
standardised and the IRB approaches qualify
for the preferential treatment of retail
exposures. In addition, the IRB approach also
provides for lower risk weights for SMEs that
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The potentially negative effect on SMEs was
a major reason behind the 2002 European
Council request to the European Commission
to present a report on the consequences of
the Basel II Framework for all sectors of
the European economy, with particular
attention to SMEs. In this “Barcelona
report”, it was concluded that the new capital
rules would present an overall beneficial
outcome for the vast majority of SMEs
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004). Therefore,
the proposed EU rules for the treatment of
SMEs do not deviate from those adopted by
the BCBS. Overall, the discussion on the
potentially adverse effects of Basel II on small
and medium-sized enterprises has now lost its
earlier intensity as the most significant
concerns have been addressed through specific
modifications to the Framework.
(g) Procyclicality
Procyclicality in the context of Basel II refers
to the exacerbation of the economic cycle as a
consequence of the new capital requirements.
In a period of strong economic growth, banks
may make more financing available at more
generous conditions, possibly resulting in an
asset boom, while in an economic downturn the
reverse could take place, resulting in a credit
crunch. Procyclicality is not a typical European
concern, but the EU rules provide for a specific
monitoring arrangement, as well as a role for
the ECB. The topic of procyclicality is
discussed in greater detail in Section 4.
(h) The consolidating supervisor
The increase of cross-border banking in the EU
and the emergence of pan-European
institutions have increased the need to
strengthen cooperation and convergence in
supervisory practices and requirements. To
meet this need, the EU capital framework has
enhanced the role of the “consolidating
supervisor”, which is the authority responsible
for the supervision of a banking group on a
consolidated basis.
This is an important innovative aspect of the
EU capital framework that should foster
supervisory convergence, financial integration
and financial stability. It has also been
identified as crucial by major cross-border
institutions, which have been vociferous in
publicly stating that the current provisions are
too modest and that they would like to see an
even more prominent role for the consolidating
supervisor. This issue will be more extensively
discussed in Section 5.
(i) Real estate lending
The rules regarding the treatment of residential
and commercial real estate lending have been
adapted to the EU context. The aim is to have a
consistent treatment for both types of lending
under the different approaches. Accordingly,
the same eligibility criteria for the recognition
of real estate collateral will be used both under
the standardised and the foundation IRB
approach. In addition, minimum requirements
to ensure reliable collateral management and
prudent valuation of mortgage property are
applicable to all approaches. This issue will be
addressed more extensively in Section 6.
(j) Covered bonds
Covered bonds have a key role in European
capital markets and in the funding of mortgage
and public sector lending. They encompass
debt securities issued by EU banks that are
subject to particular collateral arrangements
under public regulation and supervision. As yet
another distinct feature of the European
landscape, they have a specific treatment in the
new EU rules, whereas they are not addressed
under Basel II. This topic will be addressed in
greater detail in Section 7.29
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During the development of the New
Framework many observers pointed out
that the new rules might lead to increased
procyclicality in the financial system. The
ECB has also repeatedly commented on this
issue.23 Procyclicality refers to the empirical
observation that banks’ loan business tends to
follow the same cyclical pattern as that of the
real economy. Hence, loans typically show
strong growth in an economic upturn and slow
growth or even contraction in an economic
downturn. In general, banks’ lending activities
show procyclical characteristics regardless
of the design of capital requirements. This
arises, for instance, on account of the existence
of asymmetric information or market
imperfections. In the context of Basel II, the
discussion focuses on the potential for
additional procyclicality as a result of the new
capital rules.
Basel II may give rise to procyclical effects
owing to the fact that the three main input
parameters of the IRB approach are themselves
– albeit to different degrees – influenced by
cyclical movements. As regards the role of
PDs, an economic downturn may lead to an
increase in banks’ estimates of borrower PDs if
banks use a short-term assessment horizon.
Such a “point-in-time” rating changes due to
variation in the credit quality over the course of
the business cycle. By contrast, a “through-the-
cycle” rating requires a longer-term analysis of
borrowers’ default risk on the basis of a
scenario which takes into account the effect of,
for example, an economic slowdown. In the
case of the LGD, the losses that occur in the
event of a default may increase in an economic
downturn, because there is some evidence that
recoveries from defaulted debt are lower in a
recession. Finally, the exposure at default of a
loan may also increase as borrowers make more
use of their loan commitment limits during a
downturn.
These arguments indicate that, in an economic
downturn, the higher risk sensitivity of banks’
rating systems may lead to rising capital
requirements. In the event of a pronounced
recession, banks’ capital ratios may even fall
close to the 8% minimum level. If banks are
unable to adjust their capital level directly,
they may have to reduce their lending to a level
below that caused by the weaker demand in a
recessionary environment. This potentially
reduced availability of new bank lending could
then exacerbate the downturn.
4.2 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
As regards research on procyclicality, the
analysis has so far mainly concentrated on the
behaviour of bank lending during past
recessions, such as the US slowdown in the
1990s. Lowe (2002) and Allen and Saunders
(2004) survey the literature on procyclicality.
Key empirical studies on procyclicality are
Kashyap and Stein (2003), Catarineu-Rabell et
al. (2003), and Gordy and Howells (2004).
Kashyap and Stein (2003) document
comprehensive evidence for procyclical effects
in capital requirements during the 1998-2002
economic downturn. In their analysis,
particular attention is given to methodological
problems. The paper applies three alternative
credit risk approaches, namely Standard and
Poor’s credit ratings, Moody’s KMV model24
and a major international bank’s internal credit
risk model. All three methods lead to
economically significant increases in capital
requirements due to the time-varying risk
weights. Rating agency estimates for credit
risk, which should in principle take a longer
horizon, lead to increases of between 30% and
45%, whereas more “point-in-time” models
23 ECB (2005b).
24 Moody’s KMV default risk forecast is an established
indicator to calculate a firm’s credit risk on the basis of its
stock price, balance sheet information and an option pricing
model.30
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produce capital increases of between 70% and
90%. The authors also discuss possible policy
measures to mitigate these effects.
Catarineu-Rabell et al. (2003) use both a
theoretical general equilibrium model of the
banking system and an empirical analysis to
evaluate how the choice of a particular credit
risk assessment system affects the likelihood of
sharply increasing capital requirements in
recessions. The authors demonstrate that a
“point-in-time” approach could substantially
increase procyclicality. The results also
indicate that not all banks might use “through
the cycle” rating systems, therefore raising
important policy conclusions for the
implementation of the Framework. Hence, the
authors argue that banks should receive
incentives to choose more stable credit risk
assessment systems. According to the authors,
few banks have sufficient capital to cover the
increased capital requirement in a recession.
Gordy and Howells (2004) undertake a
comprehensive simulation to investigate the
impact of three measures to mitigate
procyclicality. They point out that most of the
literature focuses on procyclicality in Pillar I and
the different ways to smooth it. According to the
authors, smoothing necessarily affects risk
sensitivity. Hence, investors will not be able to
infer changes in portfolio risk from changes in
capital ratios. In order to comply with Pillar III,
they suggest an alternative solution which
consists of dampening the output instead of the
input. Here, the suggestion focuses on the design
of an autoregressive rule that only allows for a
partial adjustment of regulatory capital from one
period to the other. Therefore, sudden changes of
capital requirements would be smoothed and
procyclicality would be alleviated. This rule
should be made public to investors, who would
then be able to infer the level of current
unsmoothed capital requirements.
Marcelo and Scheicher (2005) use Moody’s
KMV model and a hypothetical portfolio of
loans to 6,000 large, non-financial EU firms
to estimate the foundation IRB capital
requirements. The paper aims to replicate, as
closely as possible, the implementation of a
foundation IRB approach using both a “point-
in-time” approach and a “through-the-cycle”
perspective. Two main points emerge in the
results (see Chart 7). First, banks’ regulatory
capital requirements under the IRB approach
remain below 8% for the hypothetical EU15
corporate portfolio, the median capital
requirement being 4.9% and the standard
deviation 0.4%. In this context, it is important
to bear in mind that the estimated decline in
regulatory minimum capital requirements
relative to Basel I does not automatically mean
a decline in the overall capital held by banks to
cover the risks. Second, the “through-the-
cycle” approach indeed overall produces
relatively low capital volatility.
Other studies arrive at similar conclusions
about the potential weight of procyclicality.25
Altman et al. (2005) undertake an extensive
simulation exercise with annual ratings
transition matrices over the period 1981-2000.
Allowing for positive correlation between
LGDs and PDs, the cyclicality of capital
charges is increased. Hence, if banks can also
use internal estimates of LGD, their sensitivity
to economic cycles might rise. According to
Chart 7 Difference in sensitivity of capital
requirements for exposures on EU firms in a
“point-in-time” and “through-the-cycle” approach
(percentages)
Source: Marcelo and Scheicher (2005).
25 See also Carling et al. (2002), Segoviano and Lowe (2002),
Illing and Paulin (2004), Amato and Furfine (2004),
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Bangia et al. (2002), US banks may require
from 25% to 30% more capital in a recession
than in a growth period. Finally, Berger and
Udell (2003) argue that problems in loan
performance are partly caused by changes in
bank behaviour during economic expansions.
In these periods, higher risk loans are provided
and the problems then materialise during the
following downturn. The cyclical variation in
loan officers’ credit standards would be a key
factor in explaining this phenomenon. The
authors test the empirical implications of this
hypothesis using a US sample over the period
1980-2000 and find empirical support for it.
4.3 MITIGATING MEASURES
In order to address procyclicality concerns, the
Basel II Framework includes a number of
specific measures, some of which were already
included in the CP3.26 In particular, under
Pillar II, banks are asked to evaluate their risk
bearing capacity with respect to scenarios
which would particularly affect their credit
exposures. In addition, banks using the IRB
approach are required to implement a more
specific credit risk “stress test” to evaluate how
certain specific events affect their capital
requirements. For this purpose, the banks’
analysis should take into consideration at least
the impact of mild economic downturns such as
two quarters of zero GDP growth. In general,
the development of reliable stress tests for
credit risk under the IRB approach is still the
focus of analytical work. It is therefore
advisable that both banks and supervisors
devote further efforts to developing suitable
methodologies.
Given the potentially cyclical behaviour of
minimum capital requirements, banks could
pre-emptively set aside sufficient capital in the
form of buffers over and above the regulatory
minimum. Such buffers, which are encouraged
under Basel II, can diminish the potentially
negative macroeconomic effects of a downturn.
In some EU countries (e.g. Spain), the practice
of “dynamic provisioning” is actively
encouraged by the supervisor. Under this
approach, the possible loss over the whole life
of the loan is taken into account in the
provisioning process, thereby giving due
consideration to the loan’s full risk profile over
the whole business cycle.
Finally, banks should in their assessment of the
borrowers’ credit risk under the IRB approach
draw on a longer time horizon (“through the
cycle” approach). This is particularly relevant
in the case of banks lending to firms in
cyclically sensitive sectors, which should be
more conservative in their assessment of the
default risk in periods of upturn. Banks are also
required to use for their own LGDs and EADs
values that have been estimated under the
scenario of an economic downturn.
Overall, it can be concluded that procyclicality
concerns were extensively addressed when the
New Framework was being developed. As
compared with earlier drafts of the Framework,
the scope for such effects has been clearly
reduced. The potential tools to reduce the
creation of additional procyclicality in the
financial system, such as forward-looking credit
risk assessments, stress tests and dynamic
provisioning, should in this context be seen as
complementary measures and exploited to the
maximum possible extent. EU supervisory
authorities have a common interest in considering
appropriate ways to reduce the risk of increased
procyclicality, since macroeconomic conditions
are gradually becoming more closely interwoven,
particularly in the euro area.
4.4 MONITORING IN THE EU
From the discussion above, it should be clear that
procyclicality resulting from the new capital
rules is not a typical EU concern, but relates to
the general design of the Framework. The above-
mentioned “Barcelona report”, which is an
impact study for the EU of the new capital rules,
concluded that the New Framework is unlikely to
26 The CP3 reduced the slope of the risk weight curve, which
expresses the relationship between the PD and the risk
weight.32
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significantly amplify the economic cycle.
However, it also said that the European
Commission and national authorities should
keep this issue under review, during the initial
transition stage and in the medium term, and
stand ready to amend the Framework should this
assessment prove too optimistic.
To this end, the CRD provides for specific
monitoring arrangements to tackle procyclicality
once the New Framework is fully implemented.
The European Commission, together with the
Member States, is required to periodically
monitor the possible effects of the CRD on the
economic cycle. In this process, a contribution
from the ECB has to be taken into account. The
European Commission has then to report on a
biennial basis to the European Parliament and the
Council and, if deemed necessary, propose
measures to address the concerns.
5 HOME-HOST ISSUES AND THE
CONSOLIDATING SUPERVISOR
5.1 INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN
CONTEXT
Banks typically perform their foreign activities
via branches and subsidiaries,27 which can
result in complicated group structures. The
New Framework will increase the need for
cooperation between the supervisors of these
different group entities because the capital
rules apply at each level of the banking group.
The implementation of the new rules may
therefore require the group to obtain approval
for its use of certain approaches from host
supervisors on a solo or sub-consolidated basis,
as well as from the home supervisor for the
(top) consolidated level.28 By indicating the
number of different countries where a selected
set of EU banking groups has subsidiaries,
Table 2 provides an indication of the potential
complexity involved in the cooperation
between home and host authorities.
In order to assist national authorities in this
complex issue, the BCBS has developed
guidance on how the new capital rules should
27 In addition, banks can also directly provide services on a
cross-border basis; this third possibility is not discussed any
further in the text. Branches, in contrast to subsidiaries, are
not separate legal entities; in the EU they benefit from the
“single passport” and “home country” control.
28 The supervisor of a foreign establishment of a banking
group, be it a branch or subsidiary, will be referred to in the
text as the host supervisor. In the event that it is necessary to
make clear the type of local establishment, the terms host
branch supervisor or host subsidiary supervisor may be used.
This terminology is not consistent with that used in the EU
directives, where the term host supervisor is reserved for the
supervisor of a foreign branch, but which is clearer to




Group name assets EU 15 EU 25 World
Deutsche Bank 804 8 10 18
BNP Paribas 783 6 9 20
Royal Bank of Scotland 638 2 2 5
ABN Amro 560 5 6 17
Fortis 425 5 6 10
Dexia 349 7 8 11
Banco Santander Central Hispano 346 5 5 18
Nordea 262 4 5 6
Banca Intesa 259 4 6 8
Danske Bank 243 2 3 3
Table 2 Number of countries where selected EU banking groups have a banking subsidiary
(EUR billlions; end 2003)
Source: Bankscope.
Note: Because of limitations of the database, the table might not be complete.33
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be implemented on a cross-border basis.29
These state that the legal responsibilities of
national supervisors remain unaffected by the
New Framework, although the home supervisor
has a key role in overseeing the implementation
process. The principles further stress the need
for enhanced cooperation and due recognition
of the host supervisors’ concerns. Finally, the
BCBS is also sensitive to the issue of increased
compliance costs as supervisors have to avoid
redundant and uncoordinated approvals.
These considerations are even more valid in the
EU, where the Single Market and the single
currency have given a significant impetus to
cross-border banking. Here, the existing
arrangements between home-host authorities
have come under increased pressure and will
even more so under the new capital rules.
Moreover, the rules also introduce new
requirements in terms of risk management and
reporting systems, which result in higher
compliance costs for banks. To alleviate some
of these concerns, the CRD streamlines the
interaction of the group with its different
supervisors, in particular for prudential
reporting and the approval of internal methods
to calculate capital requirements. Whereas
Basel II has kept the legal responsibilities of
national supervisors unchanged, the CRD
provides for an enhanced role of the
“consolidating supervisor”, the supervisor
responsible for the consolidated supervision of
a banking group.
However, giving a more prominent role to the
consolidating supervisor, which is as a rule
from the Member State where the bank heading
the group is based, raises delicate questions
about host authorities continuing to have
sufficient powers and information regarding
their banking systems. Chart 8 illustrates that
this is particularly relevant for the new Member
States. In most of them a large share of the local
banking market is foreign-controlled and some
of these foreign presences can even be
qualified as systemically relevant. For the time
being, this presence mainly takes the form of
subsidiaries, where the primary supervisory
responsibility continues to rest with the host
authority, even under the CRD. However, if
these subsidiaries were to be transformed into
branches, large segments of local banking
sectors would become directly supervised by
authorities from other EU Member States. Such
a prospect has become nearer with Nordea’s
plans to create a one-bank structure, based on
the European Company Statute, and conduct
business in local markets through branches.30
5.2 POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE
CONSOLIDATING SUPERVISOR
The consolidating supervisor, also known as
the consolidated supervisor, is responsible for
the group-wide supervision of a banking
group.31 The debate surrounding the
consolidating supervisor is sometimes
obfuscated by the use of similar terms which
cover very different meanings (see Box 4). All
these terms refer to the supervisor who takes a
group-wide perspective, but the extent of his or
her responsibilities and powers, and the way
they interact with the solo supervision of group
entities, differ strongly. At the one end of the
spectrum, the supervisor only coordinates the
collection and dissemination of information
29 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003 and 2004b).
30 Nordea (2003).
31 The CRD does not explicitly use these terms, but rather
refers to “the competent authority responsible for exercising
supervision on a consolidated basis”.
Chart 8 Market share of foreign-owned
banks in the new EU Member States
(percentages; end 2003)
Source: Own calculations on the basis of ECB (2005c).
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(“coordinating supervisor”), thus leaving the
powers of host subsidiary supervisors intact.
At the other end, the supervisor assumes almost
all the powers of the host supervisors (“lead
supervisor”). The CRD approach regarding the
extended function of the consolidating
supervisor lies somewhere in between these
two models.
Under the CRD, the consolidating supervisor
continues to check compliance with supervisory
requirements on a consolidated basis, as under
the CBD. The consolidating supervisor has also
been allocated responsibilities similar to those
of the coordinating supervisor under the
Financial Conglomerates Directive. Moreover,
additional tasks not explicitly listed may be
conferred upon him or her, which will have to be
specified in the written cooperation agreement
that the consolidating supervisor has to
conclude with the host subsidiary authorities.
Finally, and more controversially, in certain
cases, the decisions of the consolidating
supervisor will be binding for the host
supervisors.
In more detail, the tasks of the consolidating
supervisor are as follows:
– Supervisory overview and assessment of
compliance with supervisory requirements.
This covers the supervision of a parent
Box 4
OTHER SUPERVISORY ARRANGEMENTS FOR FINANCIAL GROUPS
Coordinating supervisor
The concept of a coordinating supervisor or coordinator is rooted in the Financial
Conglomerates Directive.1 Under this the coordinating supervisor is allocated the following
tasks:
– to perform a supervisory overview and assessment of compliance with supervisory
requirements in areas such as capital adequacy, risk concentration and intra-group
transactions;
– to coordinate the gathering and dissemination of information;
– to plan and coordinate supervisory activities;
– to take certain technical decisions (e.g. relating to the identification of the conglomerate,
supervisory reporting); and
– to undertake any additional tasks not mentioned in the Directive and conferred upon him or
her.
Lead supervisor and college of supervisors
The concept of lead supervisor is associated with the proposals by the European Financial
Services Round Table (EFR).2 The EFR starts from the concepts of coordinating and
consolidating supervisors, but brings them further by recommending that the principle of home
country control is extended from branches to subsidiaries. In this way, the lead supervisor
becomes responsible for the supervision of the banking group at the different (sub)consolidated
1 Directive 2002/87/EC. The Financial Conglomerates Directive is to a large extent based on earlier work by the Joint Forum, see in
particular the coordinator paper, Joint Forum (1999).
2 European Financial Services Round Table (2004 and 2005). The EFR was formed in 2001 to provide an industry voice on European
policy issues related to financial services. Its members comprise the chairpersons or chief executives of 20 leading European
financial institutions. In its report, the EFR mentions that the lead supervisor may also be called the consolidating supervisor.35
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and solo levels. The lead supervisor would be the single point of contact of the banking group with
its supervisors and would decide on all reporting schemes at the different levels of the group. In
the area of capital requirements, he or she would decide on the supervisory review process (“Pillar
II”) at the different levels, validate and authorise internal models for capital requirements and
approve the allocation of capital in the group. Host subsidiary supervisors in the EFR proposal
would still be involved via the college of supervisors that would act as a forum for information
exchange, discussion and provision of advice. However, it would not be a decision-making body,
as only the lead supervisor has the power to take decisions.
To achieve this model, the EFR suggests making extensive use of the delegation of supervisory
powers that is already in the CBD, by formalising it in a memorandum of understanding and
giving it a sound legal basis (preferably) in an EU regulation. The CBD already provides for the
possibility of delegating supervisory powers and tasks. However, it seems that up to now this
possibility has not often been used, in particular for subsidiaries. This may be due to the legal
uncertainty regarding the liability of supervisors in case of such delegation. A complicating
factor is also that cost sharing arrangements must be agreed for the performance of tasks on
behalf of another supervisor.
The terms “lead supervisor” and “college of supervisors” were already used for the supervision
of insurance groups although the content of the terms differ somewhat from the EFR concepts.
The Insurance Groups Directive3 is the legal basis for the cooperation between insurance
supervisors, and the “Helsinki Protocol” (2000) gives guidelines on how such cooperation
should work in practice. The Protocol provides for a college of supervisors, called a
coordination committee, and the lead supervisor. The latter will in practice carry out most of
the work of the group-wide supervision by pulling together all relevant information, analysing
it and sharing the findings with the coordination committee. Such a lead supervisor can only be
appointed if there is unanimity within the committee; in general, the lead supervisor will be the
supervisor of the country where the group has its dominant insurance undertaking. The
coordination committee itself is composed of supervisors of all countries in which the group
has undertakings and who are involved in its day-to-day supervision.
3 Directive 98/78/EC.
bank’s compliance with supervisory
requirements on a consolidated basis. Areas
covered are: (i) the minimum level of own
funds under Pillar I, (ii) limits regarding
shareholdings held outside the financial
sector, (iii) the process to assess that
adequate “internal” capital is available, (iv)
large exposures requirements, (v) disclosure
requirements, (vi) robust governance
arrangements.
– Coordination of the gathering and
dissemination of information. The
coordinating supervisor has to provide the
host subsidiary supervisors with all the
relevant information they need for the
supervision of these subsidiaries. The
coordinating supervisor also has a particular
information duty in the event that an
emergency situation occurs that threatens
the stability of the financial system, when he
or she has to alert the central banks and
Ministries of Finance concerned.
– Planning and coordination of supervisory
activities. Particular reference is made to the
review of compliance with the CRD
requirements and the evaluation of risks by
competent authorities under Pillar II and
inspections of foreign branches and
subsidiaries in the Member States.36
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The parent and the subsidiaries of a banking
group will be able to jointly apply to use IRB
approaches to calculate capital requirements
for credit risk, AMA for operational risk and
the recognition of internal models for market
risk. In that case, the competent authorities
have to work together on whether or not to grant
permission, and if so under what conditions.
Such an application has to be submitted only to
the consolidating supervisor. The competent
authorities have to decide on the application
within six months in a single document. In the
absence of an agreement among the authorities
involved, the consolidating supervisor shall
take its own decision. This last element in
particular has caused controversy as it shifts
powers from the supervisors of subsidiaries to
the consolidating supervisor.
5.3 ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSOLIDATING
SUPERVISOR
The more prominent role of the consolidating
supervisor in combination with the enhanced
information exchange between supervisors
provided for by the CRD, is beneficial to
financial stability and financial integration.
First, the arrangements ensure that the
consolidating supervisor has a comprehensive
group-wide view, while the host subsidiary
supervisors will have easier access to group
information that might be relevant for the
entities they supervise.
Second, for banking groups, the new
arrangements lead to a more streamlined
interaction with their different supervisors and
lower compliance costs. The risk of different,
inconsistent or even conflicting, supervisory
approaches is therefore significantly reduced.
Since large cross-border groups typically
organise some of their key business functions
on a group-wide basis, it also leads to a better
match between the way they are supervised and
managed. Finally, it contributes to the creation
of a level playing-field for European financial
institutions in the international market. A pan-
European group that has to deal with multiple
supervisors, for example, to get its internal risk
models approved, has a competitive
disadvantage compared with its US counterpart
that needs to submit only one such application.
Notwithstanding these potential benefits, the
issue of the consolidating supervisor also
raises complex implementation questions.
First, at present, the powers, resources and
experience of national supervisors differ
substantially. These differences are rooted in
factors such as the size of the financial system,
the way the supervisor is financed, political
choices and supervisory approach. Not all
countries therefore have the resources or know-
how to act as the consolidating supervisor of
major international banking groups.
Second, notwithstanding the ultimate decision-
making power of the consolidating supervisor
regarding the approval of group-wide methods,
it is important that any disagreements with host
subsidiary supervisors are adequately
addressed so as not to undermine the powers of
the host supervisors. For example, although the
consolidating supervisor would approve group-
wide advanced calculation methods for capital
requirements, it is not clear how this would
relate to the responsibility of the ongoing
supervision of these methods.
In this context, it is advisable that guidance is
developed for the cooperation between the
consolidating supervisor and the host
subsidiary supervisors, an area in which the
CEBS is already active.32 The CEBS is
developing its guidance along a risk-based and
proportional approach. Hence, the degree of
information exchange and cooperation
between supervisors should be related to the
importance of the subsidiaries, both in relation
to the host local market and the group as a
whole. In order to avoid uncertainty, it is
important that such arrangements are
formalised via memoranda of understanding
(MoU). A certain degree of flexibility is
needed in such MoUs to accommodate the
specific features of an individual group. At the
32 See in particular the CP9 of the CEBS.37
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LENDING same time, standardisation and supervisory
convergence should be aimed at ensuring a
level playing-field.
Third, in the event that the consolidating
supervisor takes a different stance to that of
the host subsidiary supervisor on certain
prudential issues, this could lead to a
competitive distortion within national markets.
In particular, institutions that are not part of a
wider group (e.g. local cooperative banks or
savings banks) could be disadvantaged
compared with institutions that belong to a
group in case the consolidating supervisor
takes a more lenient stance. Similarly, banks
that are part of a group with a different
consolidating supervisor may be treated
differently, which calls for supervisory
convergence through the CEBS.
Fourth, the granting of more powers and
responsibilities to the consolidating supervisor
should not lead to a disconnection between the
responsibilities for prudential supervision and
other closely related areas of public policy.
These include financial stability monitoring,
the management of deposit insurance,
emergency liquidity assistance and tax payer
support. Most of these areas continue to be
organised on a national basis and the
involvement of a consolidating supervisor in
the supervision of locally licensed institutions
might create difficulties.
Banking supervisors have a national mandate
and are accountable to national political bodies
such as ministries of finance and parliaments.
The latter are primarily concerned about the
impact on the national financial system or
budget. The commitment of a foreign
supervisor to entities in the host country may
therefore not be fully credible. In particular,
this is the case when the parent bank is not
systemically relevant in its home country, but
the subsidiary in the host country is. In this
scenario, it seems unlikely that the home
supervisor would have an equally strong
incentive to monitor or intervene in the local
subsidiary as the host authority. Moreover, in
the event of any public financial intervention to
support the group, in relative terms, it would
benefit the host country more than the home
country.
Finally, one should note the views of the
industry, which is pursuing an enhanced role
for the consolidating supervisor. The European
Banking Federation has already expressed its
disappointment and continues to plead for an
extension of the responsibilities of the
consolidating supervisor to Pillars II and III,
turning his or her role into that of a real
“lead supervisor”. The supervisory community
continues to be reluctant to support this model,
advocating instead increased supervisory
cooperation in combination with supervisory
convergence. In general, supervisors do not
see a need for any change in the legal
responsibilities between home and host.
However, there are other supervisors who take
a rather sympathetic view towards the lead
supervisor (Brouwer, 2004). Given the above-
mentioned considerations, it seems preferable
that before moving towards the path of the lead
supervisor, more experience is first gained with
the actual working of the extended role of the
consolidating supervisor and the potentialities
offered by the Lamfalussy framework.
6 REAL ESTATE LENDING
6.1 OVERVIEW
The differences between Basel II and the EU
rules are particularly visible in the treatment of
residential real estate (RRE) and commercial
real estate lending (CRE) under the standardised
approach. The regulatory treatment of such
lending is of great importance given the high
share of bank loans it accounts for in the EU.
Chart 9 gives an indication of this and, since it
does not include commercial real estate lending,
reflects an even larger significance than is
suggested by the figures. Moreover, CRE
lending has been a recurring cause of problems in
the banking industry over the past decades (e.g.
the savings and loans crisis in the US, the38
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Swedish banking crisis), warranting a
particularly prudent approach.
The BCBS provides for the preferential capital
treatment of certain types of real estate lending
in case it is secured by mortgages. This
preferential treatment applies to both the
standardised approach and the foundation IRB,
subject to stringent conditions to assure that the
lending exhibits low risk.
The EU rules are not a direct transposition of
Basel II. From the outset, the European
Commission aimed to be as consistent as
possible in its treatment of RRE and CRE
lending across the different approaches. The
Commission therefore extended the Basel II
conditions for preferential treatment under the
foundation IRB approach to the standardised
approach. Hence, the differences between
Basel II and the EU rules are especially
manifest in the standardised approach, on
which this paper focuses.
Although the Commission’s proposals
received criticism from the industry because
they were more stringent than Basel II in
certain respects,33 the Commission maintained
its original position. The EU rules therefore
have the merit of achieving a high degree of
consistency between the standardised approach
and the foundation IRB. As explained below, to
some extent this comes at the expense of a less
conservative treatment of CRE. However, in
the specific field of CRE that produces income
to service the debt, the EU rules apply the same
criteria as Basel II. This is important from a
financial stability point of view, given the
lower additional protection provided by that
type of collateral.
6.2 RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE
The preferential risk weights for secured RRE
lending under the standardised approach are
identical under Basel II and the CRD.
However, the difference lies in the criteria to be
met for these lower risk weights (see Table 3).
The main difference is that the CRD imposes
two independence criteria.34 By contrast, Basel
II does not impose these criteria under the
standardised approach, but only under the
foundation IRB. Hence, in this respect the EU
rules are more conservative.
The first independence criterion (borrower risk
does not influence property value) is typically
given for RRE. The exception might be the case
Table 3 Requirements for a preferential risk weighting of residential real estate lending
Basel II  CRD
35% risk weight for RRE lending instead of 100%
1. Over-collateralisation Yes, but not quantified Yes, but not quantified
2. Property value not materially depending on borrower credit quality No Yes
3. Borrower risk not materially depending on collateral value No Yes, but may be waived if
loss rates in the jurisdiction
are “sufficiently low”
33 European Mortgage Federation (2003).
34 Where independence of collateral value and borrower default
risk is not given, the additional protection from the collateral
is limited. This is often referred to as “wrong-way” risk.
Chart 9 Loans for house purchases as share
of total loans to non-banks
(percentages; end 2004)
Source: ECB.
















DK NL FI DE PT BE ES IE Euro
Area
FR SE GR AT IT LU UK39
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 42
December 2005
6  REAL ESTATE
LENDING of very special property that is tailored to
individual needs and is therefore difficult to
resell.
The second independence criterion (property
value does not influence borrower risk) is a
constraining factor when the borrower has to
rely on the collateral’s rental income to serve
the loan. This criterion would exclude from the
preferential treatment firms that specialise in
owning and letting residential real estate. In
these cases, the collateral offers only limited
additional protection compared to an
unsecured loan because the default of the
borrower will typically result from insufficient
rental income. Under such conditions, it is very
likely that the property value as derived from
the discounted net rental income will also have
been negatively affected.
The fact that the borrower relies on the income
from the collateral does not necessarily mean
that the credit risk of such exposure is similar
to that of an unsecured exposure. More
specifically, the credit risk will depend on how
the loss expectation in RRE lending compares
with the loss expectation of other loans. In its
proposal, the Commission assumed that the
loss expectation in RRE lending varies among
national markets. It also allows national
authorities to dispense with the second
independence criterion within their national
market under certain conditions.
The condition for such a waiver is that the
national authorities have evidence of loss rates
that are sufficiently low to justify such
treatment. Given that the CRD offers no
guidance as to how to assess this,
implementation efforts should focus on what
constitutes sufficiently low loss rates. This is
one of the fields where supervisors, through the
CEBS, could achieve a harmonised
implementation. Starting with an analysis of
national loss rates and comparing them with
loss rates for other asset classes, it should be
possible to define a quantitative threshold.
This common threshold would facilitate the
mutual recognition of preferential risk weights
and thereby promote the integration of a
European market for RRE lending.
While data on loss rates for RRE lending are
not readily available, the volatility of
residential property prices can be assumed to
be an important driver. In this respect, it is
interesting to note that there are pronounced
differences in the development of housing
prices across Member States (see Chart 10). It
is likely that these differences also translate
into differences in loss rates.
Finally, a more subtle difference between
Basel II and the EU rules is that, under the
latter, the collateral must be used or rented-out
by the owner, who may not be the borrower.
Basel II, by contrast, requires this to be the
borrower. In both cases, purely speculative
holdings of property would be excluded.
However, the CRD would allow for situations
where a loan to a small firm (i.e. the borrower)
is secured by a mortgage on the residence
of the firm’s owner. Such situations may be
especially relevant for SMEs.
Chart 10 Differences in residential property
price changes across EU countries
(percentages)
Source: ECB, based on non-harmonised national data.
Note: EU average is GDP-weighted (value: 9%). Bars are
calculated as average annual percentage changes over the
indicated period and the non-horizontal line measures
the difference relative to EU151) average for the period
2000-2003.
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6.3 COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE
CRE lending is a particularly sensitive area as,
in the past, banking crises have sometimes
coincided with a crisis in the commercial real
estate market. Strict regulatory criteria have
therefore to be met before such lending can
benefit from a preferential capital treatment.
Under Basel II, the preferential treatment for
CRE is only made available in national markets
where the loss rates observed in the past do not
exceed certain thresholds (see Table 4). The
CRD, by contrast, is more flexible since it
imposes the requirement on loss rates only in
cases where the property value materially
influences the borrower risk; this is basically
where the borrower has to rely on the
collateral’s rental income to serve the loan. As
a result, in the EU, jurisdictions where the
thresholds are exceeded can also apply for a
preferential CRE treatment.35 This extended
preferential treatment reflects the fact that a
loan to a firm that does not rely on real estate
income is less risky than an otherwise identical
unsecured loan.
Basel II specifically lists offices and multi-
purpose or multi-tenanted properties as eligible
types of property. The CRD, by contrast, does
not include a restriction on the type of
premises, but imposes an abstract
independence criterion for the property value
Table 4 Requirements for a preferential risk weighting of commercial real estate lending
Basel II  CRD
50% risk weight for CRE lending instead of 100%
1. Over-collateralisation (eligible lending may exceed neither Yes Yes
50% of market value nor 60% of mortgage lending value)
2. Property value not materially depending on borrower credit quality Yes, implicitly: Yes
property must be offices
or multi-purpose/
multi-tenanted
3. Borrower risk not materially dependent on collateral value No Yes, but may be waived if
point 4 is met.
4. Loss rates (as percent of outstanding CRE) in the jurisdiction Yes No (i.e. not generally,
not in excess 0.3% on eligible loans and 0.5% overall see point 3.)
not to depend on the borrower risk. This
basically serves the same purpose as listing the
property types, but gives more leeway for
prudential judgement. With a view to achieving
a level playing-field, it is important that
European supervisors strive for convergence in
this area.
Another distinguishing feature of the EU
framework is the preferential treatment for
CRE leasing. Such leasing can obtain the lower
risk weight when the conditions for the
recognition of mortgage lending are met. The
only specific requirement is that the lessor, i.e.
the party which rents out the property, retains
full ownership in the same way as a mortgage
lender. However, depending on the structure
of the lease, a lessor may also be exposed
to specific risks that are not incurred by a
mortgage lender. For example, a lessor may
incur a price risk when having to sell the
property if it is not fully amortised. While such
leasing-specific risks are not addressed in the
CRD, a prudent implementation should only
extend the preferential treatment to those
leases under which the lessor bears risks that
are not larger than those of a mortgage lender.
35 Under the foundation IRB, Basel II also allows for
recognition of this loss-reducing effect. In this way, the
Commission’s proposal achieves higher consistency across
approaches.41
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7 COVERED BONDS
7.1 CONCEPT OF COVERED BOND
The EU rules provide for a specific treatment of
covered bonds, which is not present in Basel II.
A covered bond is a secured bond issued by a
bank or other financial institution. However,
the security for the bond is not merely over the
institution’s assets generally but a designated
pool of assets, typically mortgage loans or
public sector loans, is specifically designated
as collateral. Covered bonds differ from
securitisation bonds in a number of important
respects. First, bondholders have recourse both
to the issuing institution and to the assets that
provide cover for the bonds. Second, the bonds
do not achieve off-balance sheet treatment as
the asset pool that provides cover remains on
the institution’s balance sheet.
Such financing instruments are of great
importance in the EU capital markets, although
their significance differs across Member States
(see Chart 11). Several Member States have in
the recent past adopted legislation to allow the
issuance of such bonds. It is therefore justified
that the CRD takes account of this typical
European instrument. Since the most common
form (the German “Pfandbrief”) is well-known
outside European capital markets, even a
specific treatment under Basel II itself might
have been desirable.
The treatment of covered bonds under the EU
rules is based on the legal definition of this
instrument in the UCITS Directive
(Undertakings for Collective Investment in
Transferable Securities),36 which is very broad.
It does not refer to an identical instrument in all
Member States, but rather to a range of
instruments that are not subject to harmonised
rules at the EU level. In this way, the definition
accommodates for the wide differences that
exist in national laws on covered bonds in areas
such as assets used as collateral, restrictions
placed the issuing bank’s activities, the degree
of “over-collateralisation”, and the way
bankruptcy remoteness is achieved. Over-
collateralisation refers to the extent to which
the value of the collateral has to be higher than
the nominal value of the bond and bankruptcy
remoteness ensures that the bond holders’
access to the collateral is truly superior to that
of all other creditors.
In the light of this diversity, the definition of
covered bonds for the purposes of capital
requirements is more restrictive as only
specific assets – in some cases subject to over-
collateralisation – may be used as collateral.
The CRD lists in this context mainly:
– exposures that qualify for a 0% risk weight
under the standardised approach. This
includes exposures on central governments,
central banks, multilateral development
banks and international organisations.
Exposures to other public sector entities,
regional governments and local authorities
may also be included if they are considered
to carry the same credit risk as central
governments;
– loans secured by residential real estate
mortgages which, including prior liens, are
no more than 80% of the value of the
property; and
36 Directive 85/611/EEC, art. 22(4).
Chart 11 Share of covered bonds in the
issues of private sector bonds outstanding
(percentages; end 2003)
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– loans secured by commercial real estate
mortgages which, including prior liens, are no
more than 60% of the value of the property.
The competent authorities may also recognise
loans where this “loan-to-value” ratio is up to
70%; the condition is that the value of the
total assets pledged (i.e. not only the
mortgaged assets) exceeds the outstanding
amount of the bonds by at least 10%;
Further, up to 10% of the outstanding covered
bonds may be covered by exposures to banks
and investment firms. In this way, the issuing
bank may to a certain extent replace eligible
collateral by deposits with banks of a high
credit standing when collateral is scarce.
The additional restrictiveness under the CRD
is not expected to lead to a large scale
ineligibility of instruments that are issued
under national legislations. Rather, the present
range of covered bonds in the EU will also be
eligible for the preferential capital treatment.
For example, the “loan-to-value” limits for
mortgage loans in the CRD reflect the highest
thresholds present in these legislations, though
a number of them are more conservative. For
example, the 10% limit for the substitution of
eligible assets by other assets such as bank
deposits, is a possible constraint for some
Member States that currently allow higher
limits.
7.2 CAPITAL TREATMENT
The covered bonds that meet the CRD
requirement are treated as exposures to banks.
The risk weighting is based on the credit
standing of the issuing bank, while at the same
time recognising the effects of the collateral.
The collateral is recognised in the form of
reduced risk weights under the standardised
approach or in the form of reduced LGDs under
the IRB approaches.
Under the standardised approach, covered
bonds receive reduced risk weights based on
the weights of senior exposures to the issuer in
the manner described in Table 5.
As regards treatment under the IRB
approaches, the EU rules are fully consistent
with Basel II, since a bank’s internal rating
system needs to comprise both a borrower and
a facility dimension. Based on the borrower
dimension, PDs are assigned to exposures,
while the facility dimension underlies the
assignment of LGDs. The collateral to which
the bondholders have a preferential claim
affects the facility dimension. While Basel II
does not encompass any specific rules for
covered bonds, the collateral of the bond would
lead to a reduced LGD if the bank were able to
get supervisory approval for an estimate of this
collateral effect under the advanced IRB.
Under the foundation IRB, such covered bonds
may receive a reduced supervisory LGD of
12.5%.37 The advanced IRB would require the
investing bank to use its own LGD estimates
for covered bonds. Under both the foundation
and advanced IRB the risk weights continue to
depend also on the PD of the issuer.
Chart 12 depicts the risk weights for all
approaches. It shows that in many situations,
the standardised approach will deliver the
Risk weight of senior exposure to issuer 20 50 100 150
Covered bond risk weight 10 20 50 100
Table 5 Risk weights for the issuer and covered bonds under the standardised approach
(percentages)
37 Compare this with the supervisory LGD of 45% for senior
claims and 75% for subordinated claims. For certain covered
bonds, the LGD may further be reduced to 11.25% until the
end of 2010.43
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38 This is the “Option 1” of the standardised approach; by
contrast, under “Option 2”, the risk weights for exposures on
banks are directly determined on the basis of the banks’
ratings and not on the basis of the sovereign’s rating. See also
Section 2.2.1.
39 With an LGD of less than 7%, capital requirements for
covered bonds under the advanced IRB (M = 5 years) would
be consistently lower than under the foundation IRB.
lowest risk weights for covered bonds in
jurisdictions where risk weights for exposures
to banks are based on the ratings of the
sovereign38 and the sovereign itself receives a
0% risk weight. Only for issuers with very low
PDs would the IRB approaches lead to lower
risk weights. Default experience for corporate
borrowers published by rating agencies
suggests that this will only be the case for
issuers whose rating for their senior debt is
comparable to an S&P rating of “AA” or better.
How the outcome under the advanced IRB
relates to the other approaches depends very
much on the assumptions for the M and LGD
risk factors. For M, one can assume the
maximum possible value of five years given the
usually long maturities of covered bonds. For
LGD, Chart 12 assumes the same value as the
supervisory LGD (i.e. 12.5%) because there is
a lack of default experience, a difficulty that
banks under the advanced IRB will also face.
On the basis of these assumptions, the
advanced IRB appears unattractive compared
with the foundation IRB because, under the
latter, M will in most cases be fixed at 2.5
years. However, this can change if a bank
receives supervisory approval for lower
estimates of LGD.39
Another observation from this comparison is
that, in jurisdictions where risk weights for
banks are directly based on their own ratings
rather than on those of their sovereign, the
resulting weights for covered and non-covered
issues will often be the same. For example,
when an issuer’s senior debt has an S&P rating
of “A” under the standardised approach of
Basel II it would receive a 50% risk weight. For
the same issuer’s covered bonds, a 20%
weighting would apply under the EU rules. But
this 20% would often apply anyway, even
without the specific EU treatment, given that
covered bonds have typically issue specific
ratings of “AA” or better that results in the
same risk weight.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper provides an overview of the New
Basel Capital Framework from an EU
perspective and discusses certain important
issues relating to the implementation of Basel
II in the EU. Despite the similarities between
the draft EU framework and the BCBS
proposal, a number of different treatments are
justified by EU specificities.
The Basel II Framework is expected to foster
stability in the EU financial system. This
objective will be achieved by strengthening
incentives for banks to conduct sound risk
modelling and management, and by involving
supervisors more directly in the review of
banks’ risk profiles, risk management practices
and risk-bearing capacity. Furthermore, the
new disclosure requirements will enable
market participants to have better information
on banks, which will support the functioning of
market discipline. These beneficial effects on
the financial system will also translate into a
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positive contribution to the EU economy at
large.
Notwithstanding, there are still a number of
key challenges in the EU implementation
process which need to be tackled in order to
fully reap the potential benefits of Basel II.
First, it is important to preserve a level playing-
field across the EU. A consistent
implementation of the EU rules into national
legislation and a coherent application of the
framework are therefore necessary. In this
context, reducing the number of options in the
draft EU capital requirements framework is a
challenging task. The CEBS has already made
progress here, which needs to be kept up. The
EU will also have to follow-up closely on how
Basel II will be implemented in the US and how
the decisions by US authorities will interact
with the activity of EU banks in the US and
decisions by EU supervisors.
Second, the debate on the optimal design of the
consolidating supervisor’s functions continues
as some of the largest firms want to move to the
“lead supervisor” model. Although pursuing an
enhanced role for the consolidating supervisor
offers advantages from the perspectives of
financial integration and financial stability,
there remain a number of complex
implementation issues that need to be taken
into account.
Third, the potentially adverse effects of capital
requirements on the EU macroeconomic
environment require ongoing monitoring. This
issue and the related question of the structural
impact of the new rules on the financial system
are of particular interest to many
constituencies, including central banks. This
explains the reference to the role of the ECB in
the monitoring of possible procyclical effects
in the CRD.
In the medium-term, a number of issues may
potentially achieve increasing prominence.
First, the impact of the new accounting
measures on the capital definition may turn out
to be quite important. Here, banking
supervisors have already considered the
interplay between the implementation of
certain International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) and the definition of
regulatory capital. There are also plans to carry
out a more fundamental review of the definition
of regulatory capital.
Another medium-term issue is the nexus of
market and credit risk, which may bring the
current market risk treatment under further
scrutiny. As things stand, the border between
the two risk categories is not very clear. Due to
the improved abilities to trade, hedge and value
credit risk related instruments, they play an
increasingly significant role in the trading
books of financial institutions. This, however,
raises concerns over the prudence of the
present simple approach to the specific market
risk of debt instruments in the trading book. An
example of this is the impressive development
of credit derivatives and Collateralised Debt
Obligations (CDOs). At this stage, the BCBS
does not plan to issue new rules on the existing
boundary between trading book and banking
book, and only a limited number of adaptations
to the current regime were recently adopted.
However, in the future, the financial industry
may call for a harmonised treatment of these
two main risk categories.40
Finally, and in relation to the preceding issue,
the use of credit portfolio management is
undergoing significant changes. Banks have
started to apply increasingly sophisticated
portfolio approaches to their loan books. The
modelling of credit correlations and portfolio
diversification effects is a very active area of
research, both among practitioners and
academics. Hence, the BCBS’s decision to
limit recognition for regulatory capital
purposes to the single risk factor IRB approach
may come under increased scrutiny in the
future.
40 Duffie and Singleton (2003) provide a detailed analysis of
credit derivatives and also discuss the integrated modeling of
market and credit risk.45
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Advanced (calculation) approaches: methods available to banks to calculate their regulatory
capital requirements based on own risk estimates. Includes the foundation and advanced internal
ratings-based (IRB) approach for credit risk, the advanced measurement approaches (AMA) for
operational risk, and the internal models approach for market risk.
Asymptotic single risk factor (ASRF) model: theoretical model underlying the risk weight
function (which relates risk factors to risk weights) of the internal ratings-based approach.
Banking book: the bank portfolio consisting of financial instruments that are not held for trading.
Capital ratio: ratio of regulatory own funds (core capital and supplementary capital) to total risk-
weighted assets. Also called solvency ratio.
Consolidating supervisor: the supervisor responsible for the supervision on a consolidated basis
of a banking group. As a rule, this is the supervisor of the Member State where the parent bank of
the group is based.
Core capital: regulatory capital that consists of own funds components of the highest quality,
such as fully-paid capital and disclosed reserves from post-tax retained earnings. Also called Tier
1 capital.
Covered bond: a secured bond issued by a bank or other financial institution. The security of the
bond is not merely over the institution’s assets generally, but also over a designated pool of assets,
typically mortgage loans or public sector loans.
Credit risk: risk of losses in on and off-balance sheet positions resulting from the failure of a
counterparty to perform according to a contractual arrangement.
Double default: refers to the fact that the risk of both a borrower and a guarantor defaulting on the
same obligation may be substantially lower than the risk of only one of the parties defaulting.
Economic capital: capital held and allocated by the bank internally as a result of its own
assessment of risk. It can differ from regulatory capital, which is determined according to
supervisory rules.
Effective maturity: remaining time before a borrower is scheduled to fulfil his obligation;  one of
the requested input parameters to derive the risk weight under the internal ratings-based
approach.
Expected loss: (credit) losses that are expected to occur within a certain time period (generally
one year).
Exposure at default (EAD): the exposure a bank is likely to have on a borrower at the moment the
borrow defaults; one of the requested input parameters to derive the risk weight under the internal
ratings-based approach.46
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External credit assessment institution (ECAI): institution recognised by supervisors and
whose assessments may be used to calculate regulatory capital requirements for credit risk under
the standardised approach.
Internal ratings-based (IRB) approach: advanced approach by which a bank can use its own
credit assessments to calculate its regulatory capital requirements for credit risk. Depending on
the risk factors the bank is allowed to estimate, a distinction is made between a foundation IRB
and an advanced IRB approach.
Lead supervisor: supervisory model under which the consolidating supervisor would be the
single supervisory contact point of a banking group, both for its branches and subsidiaries. In the
area of capital requirements, the lead supervisor’s tasks and responsibilities would extend to the
three pillars of the New Framework.
Loss given default (LGD): the loss, measured as a percentage of the exposure at default, which is
likely to occur in case a borrower defaults; one of the required input parameters to derive the risk
weight under the internal ratings-based approach.
Madrid compromise: the agreement reached by the Basel Committee in January 2004 to
calibrate the risk weight functions used in the internal ratings-based approach on the basis of
unexpected credit losses only.
Market risk: risk of losses in on and off-balance sheet positions arising from movements in
market prices and volatilities.
Operational risk: risk of losses resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people or
systems, or from external events. It includes legal, but not reputational or legal risk.
Permanent partial use: in the context of credit risk, this refers to the combined use of the
standardised approach for certain exposure classes whilst applying the more sophisticated IRB
approaches for the remaining classes on a non-temporary basis.
Probability of default (PD): the likelihood that a borrower will default within a certain time
period (generally one year); one of the required input parameters to derive the risk weight under
the internal ratings-based approach.
Procyclicality: exacerbation of the economic cycle as a result of changes in regulatory capital
requirements.
Quantitative Impact Study (QIS): data collection exercise organised by supervisors to assess
the impact of the new capital rules on banks.
Regulatory capital (own funds): own funds that are eligible to meet the regulatory capital
requirements; consist of core capital and supplementary capital, after a number of deductions.
Regulatory capital is the numerator of the capital ratio.
Risk-weighted assets: risk measure that consists of multiplying each asset value by a factor (risk
weight) that is a proxy of the (credit) risk related to the asset class. Risk-weighted assets are the47
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GLOSSARY
denominator of the capital ratio. For operational risk and market risk, the risk-weighted assets
that enter into the capital ratio are derived from the directly calculated capital requirements.
Solvency ratio: see capital ratio.
Standardised approach: method by which a bank can use external ratings (if available) by
external credit assessment institutions to calculate its regulatory capital requirements for credit
risk.
Supplementary capital: regulatory capital that consists of own funds of a lower quality than core
capital, such as certain types of subordinated debt; also called Tier 2/Tier 3 capital.
Trading book: the bank portfolio consisting of financial instruments that are in principle held for
short-term trading purposes, i.e. they are held intentionally for short-term resale and/or with the
intent of benefiting from short-term price movements or to lock in arbitrage profits.
Unexpected loss: (credit) losses which may occur above the expected loss within a certain time
period (e.g. one year) and within a high confidence level (e.g. 99.9%).48
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